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This study is an attempt to compare civil-military relations and its problems in
Germany and Russia and to analyse the following overall question : What are the Problems
and Challenges ofCivil-Military Relations in Theory, History, Present Time, and Future ?
The thesis examines five selected issues of civil-military relations and its problems to
analyse the overall question and to substantiate the overall thesis : Theory, German history,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Russian history, and the Russian Federation / Russia.
The present Russian government should analyse the German case to find some
answers to the problems of democratization and civil-military relations. But Russia must
keep in mind the historical context and the specific circumstances of democratization as well
as Innere Fuhrung in Germany after World War II. The central problem is whether Russia
will be able to establish a viable democracy like the Federal Republic ofGermany after World
War II or will relapse into authoritarianism, post-totalitarianism or even totalitarianism and a
passion for empire-building and hegemony, like Nazi Germany after the failure of the
Weimar Republic. This is really a problem because contemporary Russia seems more
comparable with the Weimar Republic than with the Federal Republic of Germany.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This study is an attempt to compare 1 civil-military relations and its problems in the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Russian Federation / Russia and to analyse the
following overall question :
What are the Problems and Challenges of Civil-Military Relations in
Theory, History, Present Time, and Future ?
The process of democratization is usually complex and prolonged, and it involves
bringing about the end of the non-democratic regime, the inauguration of the democratic
system, and then the consolidation ofthe democratic system. 2
Democratization entails liberalization but is a wider and more specifically
political concept. Democratization requires open contestation over the
right to win control of the government, and this in turn requires free
competitive elections, the results of which determine who governs. Using
these definitions, it is obvious that there can be liberalization without
democratization. ... Essentially, we mean by a consolidated democracy a
political situation in which, in a phrase, democracy has become the only
game in town 3
The main argument of this thesis is that the process of democratization and the
study of civil-military relations must not end with the successful transition towards
democracy. A viable democracy rather depends on a successful consolidation of
democracy and a solution to the problems of civil-military relations.
1 Concerning the strange debate among political scientists as to whether postcommunist transitions can
be usefulh compared with other transitions to democracy see, e.g., Nodia, Ghia, "How Different Are
Postcommunist Transitions ?" Journal of Democracy, vol. 7, no. 4, October 1996, pp. 15-29.
2 Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century , Norman
and London : University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p. 9.
3 Lmz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern
Europe. South America, and Post-Communist Europe , Baltimore and London : The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1996. pp. 3 and 5.
This study examines five key issues in the study of civil-military relations in order
to analyse the overall question and to substantiate the overall thesis :
(1) -theory;
(2) - German history;
(3) - Federal Republic of Germany;
(4) - Russian history;
(5) - Russian Federation / Russia.
Chapter II, Aspects of Civil-Military Relations - Theory, gives a theoretical
background for the analysis of civil-military relations and presents the problems in the
process of democratization focusing on three selected issues : (A.) Civil-Military
Relations; (B.) Transition towards Democracy; (C.) Consolidation ofDemocracy.
In a common sense civil-military relations addresses the relationship of the military
to the state.
4 Only military dictatorships have no problem with civil-military relations and
civilian control of their armed forces. All other governments, from the most savage of
civilian dictatorships to the most participatory of democracies, worry about keeping their
armed forces subordinate to the political will. Regardless of the nature of the political
culture in which he lives, the modern military officer is oriented toward maximizing his
influence in politics and/or policy. In nations with highly institutionalized political systems,
the military attempts to exert its influence over the making of national security policy. In
nations with poorly institutionalized political structures, the government itself is the prize
sought by the military. 5 Civilian control over the armed forces is such an important issue
and necessity because the military wields the power to defend society and democracy and
so has the power to destroy society and democracy.
4
Bracken, Paul, "Reconsidering Civil-Military Relations," in Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-
Carew (editors), U.S. Civil-Military Relations - In Crisis or Transition ? Washington, DC. : The Center
for Strategic and International Studies, 1995, p. 145.
Bernstein, Alvin H., "Civilian Control of the Military in a Democratic Society," Speech - Executive
Level Seminar on Democratic Defense Planning and Budgeting, European Center for Security Studies ,
Garmisch-Partenkirchen (GE), 1996, pp. 3-7.
One of the most crucial challenges that democratizing states face is that of
redefining civil-military relations and transforming the military into a force
loyal to the new democratic systems. In order to prevent the military from
becoming a threat, democratizing governments must reeducate their
military professionals and instill in them a sense of respect for democratic
institutions and the multi-party system. The goal is to limit the military's
role in politics and develop a tradition of an apolitical army. 6
The issue of civil-military relations is very complex, and civilian control (Samuel
P. Huntington) and / or civilian supremacy (Felipe Agiiero) is only one important aspect
of civil-military relations. 7 Another way to think about civil-military relations in the
post-cold war era is as a problem of organizational design (Paul Bracken) rather than
civilian control because framing the problem as one of designing a military for the future
allows a more balanced consideration of more important, although less dramatic, issues
than civilian control. 8 A central problem of post-cold war civil-military relations is the
extent to which key subsystems ~ budgetary, industrial base, military, and civilian
leadership ~ can be realigned for the new environment.
But all in all the present theories of civil-military relations are controversial and do
not capture the complexity of civil-military relations. According to one observer of
Russian affairs, "The development during the last months of the Soviet Union and the
current political development in Russia defy the well-developed theories of civil-military
relations."
9
A post-cold war concept of civil-military relations which is characterized by a
permanent process with interdependent relations between state, society, and armed forces
must also pay attention to the integration of armed forces into state and society.
6
Brusstar, James H. and Jones, Ellen, The Russian Military's Role in Politics, Washington, D.C. :
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, McNair Paper 34, 1995, p. 1.
Felipe Agiiero s civilian supremacy is closely related — but not identical — to Samuel P. Huntington's
objective civilian control. Agiiero, Felipe, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy : Post-Franco Spain in
Comparative Perspective, Baltimore and London : The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, pp. 19-23;
and Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military
Relations
.
Cambridge and London : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957, pp. 80-85.
8
Bracken, pp. 145-165.
9 Tsypkin, Mikhail, "Will the Military Rule Russia ?" Security Studies , vol. 2, no. 1, 1992, p. 39.
This study defines civil-military relations as a triangle between state, society, and
armed forces which balances and guarantees the following three aspects :
(1) - civilian control / civilian supremacy over the military in general;
(2) - civil-military cooperation concerning national security issues;
(3) - integration of the armed forces and soldiers into state and society.
Perhaps this last aspect is the greatest challenge of civil-military relations in the
Russian Federation / Russia today. Especially the ethnic problems seem to be the conditio
sine qua non in the process of successful democratization because ethnic problems are
related to the problems ofstateness}
Chapter HI, Aspects of Civil-Military Relations - German History, underlines the
problems of civil-military relations in Prussia / Germany from the beginning of the
professionalization of the military in Prussia until the catastrophe of the Third Reich. The
history of Germany provides good examples to underline the problems and challenges of
civil-military relations. In Germany the patterns of civil-military relations could hardly be
more dissimilar. Probably no country has had a wider variety of experiences in
civil-military relations than Germany.
No other officer corps achieved such high standards of professionalism,
and the officer corps ofno other major power was in the end so completely
prostituted. Each chapter of the German story has its lesson and its
warnings. The imperial experience shows the benefits of civilian control.
The republican period demonstrates the difficulty of achieving that control
amidst political chaos. World War I illustrates the disastrous results when
military men assume political roles. Nazi rule illustrates the equally
catastrophic results when military warnings are unheeded and political
leaders ride roughshod over the soldiers. The variety of German
civil-military relations makes its history a terrifying but highly instructive
study.
11
10 Linz and Stepan, p. 7.
11 Huntington, The Soldier and the State , p. 98.
A very important question in the 1920s was whether Germany would be able to
establish a viable democracy or relapse into authoritarianism and a passion for hegemony-
building. Since 1919 Germany was a democracy with open elections and a democratic
constitution. The transition from the authoritarian Kaiserreich towards the first German
democracy was successful. But Weimar never was a consolidated democracy. The first
German democracy opened the way for the totalitarian Nazi-Germany.
Chapter IV, Aspects of Civil-Military Relations - Federal Republic of Germany,
analyses civil-military relations and its problems in Germany after World War II including
the unification of Germany in 1989/90 and focuses on two selected issues : (A.) German
Foreign Policy; (B.) the Bundeswehr in State and Society. Since the German rearmament
in 1955 Innere Fiihrung has made the German Armed Forces an integral and natural
component of state order and society in the Federal Republic of Germany. Innere
Fiihrung or Inner Leadership includes Leadership and Civic Education. But strictly
understood Innere Fiihrung ~ like other German words that describe a whole complex of
philosophical ideas ~ has no adequate, concise English translation.
Long the subject of an intense debate, it can be described as military
leadership appropriate to the modern world, which enables the soldier to
carry out his mission while assuring his rights as a citizen. ... Innere
Fiihrung has been the Federal Republic's ongoing attempt to reconcile the
citizen with the soldier, and to overcome the traditional antagonism
between democracy and the military in German history. 12
The concept ofInnere Fiihrung and the model of the democratic citizen in uniform
are hallmarks of the German Bundeswehr 13 It is a very successful concept for the
comprehensive integration ofarmed forces into a democratic state and society ~ at least in
the German case. Furthermore, right from the very beginning, the Bundeswehr has
accomplished a great deal in bringing about the completion of internal German unity since
12 Abenheim, Donald Reforging the Iron Cross : The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed
Forces, Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1988. pp. 44-45.
13 German Bundeswehr is the name for the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Germany and
includes all three services : Army, Air Force, and Navy.
1990. 14 This is why the concept of Innere Fiihrung has also become a model for new
democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin America, when they consider how to rebuild
their armed forces and to solve the problems of civil-military relations in the ongoing
process of transition toward and consolidation of democracy.
Chapter V, Aspects of Civil-Military Relations - Russian History, focuses on
some selected issues of civil-military relations and its problems in two periods : (A.)
Imperial Russia (1863-1917); (B.) Russia / Soviet Union (1917-1991). Beside Germany
the history of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union also provides good examples to
underline the problems and challenges of tivil-military relations. In history the situation in
Russia changed several times. But Russia never was confronted with the consolidation of
democracy and its problems. "There is only one thing that Russia has not seen in one
thousand years — freedom." 15
A military coup in the Soviet Union was unlikely because there was no tradition of
successful military coups in Russian / Soviet history. "It is equally established in the
Russian / Soviet tradition, however, that whenever the civilian authority is weakened by a
succession of crisis or by a revolutionary upheaval, no government can survive without
controlling the military or receiving its political support." 16
In late Imperial Russia civil-military conflict was a reality and a result of the
emergence of a professional Russian officer corps. Then, in the Soviet Union, the society
was militarized, and civil-military relations were dominated by the party-state system. The
dominant party with its bureaucracy controlled the military effectively until the middle of
1990, when the Communist Party was no longer the main political force in the Soviet
Union. With the failed August Coup of 1991 it became obvious that the Communist Party
had lost its power over the military.
14
Federal Ministry of Defense (editor), White Paper 1994. White Paper on the Security of the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr. Bonn (GE) : Press and Information
Office of the Federal Government, 1994, pp. 15 and 132.
15 Grossman, Vasily, in Ryszard Kapuscinski, Imperium , New York : Alfred Knopf, Inc., 1994, preface.
16 Tsypkin, "Will the Military Rule Russia?", pp. 42-43.
The military in Russian and Soviet history never took power for itself. The
Russian/Soviet political elites, however, have generally found it impossible
to keep or achieve power without active support from the military because
of the country's lack of representative institutions, vast ethnic diversity,
and sheer size. 17
Chapter VI, Aspects of Civil-Military Relations - Russian Federation / Russia,
analyses civil-military relations and its problems in the Russian Federation / Russia during
and after the collapse of the Soviet Union and focuses on two selected issues : (A.)
Russian Foreign and Security Policy; (B.) the Russian Armed Forces in State and Society.
In 1989 the Berlin Wall came down, leading to the unification of Germany. The
end of the Cold War started the process of a fundamental transformation of the security
structure in Europe. It gave rise to hopes that Europe would no longer be divided.
The conventional wisdom holds that the dissolution of the Soviet Union
changed the world. But the initial hopeful notion ... of unprecedented
peace and tranquillity was far too optimistic. ... One of the most important
questions in the post-cold war era has been whether Russia will be able to
establish a viable democracy or will relapse into authoritarianism and a
passion for empire-building. 18
Since Peter the Great Russia has usually been feared, if not respected, by its
neighbors, and whether Russia likes it or not, Russia is, and will remain, a great European
power. To bring Russia into a fruitful and cooperative relationship with the rest of the
modern world is surely the greatest prize for Russian and Western politicians alike. "To
despair, to fall back into the attitudes of the past — whether those of the Cold War or
those ofthe 19* century — would be a negation of statemanship." 19
During the last six years the generals in the Soviet Union / Russia became involved
with domestic politics during the course of two violent upheavals. The August Coup in
1991 as well as the October Mutiny in 1993 failed, and in both cases the military did not
17
Ibid, p. 44.
18
Leslie Lenkowsky, President of the Hudson Institute, in Odom, William E. and Dujarric, Robert,
Commonwealth or Empire ? Russia, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus, Indianapolis; Indiana : Hudson
Institute, 1995, p. XVII.
19
Braitwaite, Rodic, "Russian Realities and Western Politics," Survival , vol. 3, 1994, p. 24.
assume political power. "The two attempts to seize power espoused similar objectives : to
turn back the clock and restore the old USSR system within its former geographic
boundaries." 20
Chapter VII, Conclusion, summarizes the main findings of this thesis and explains
some implications of these findings.
As mentioned before, the main argument of this thesis is that the process of
democratization and the study of civil-military relations must not end with the successful
transition towards democracy. A viable democracy rather depends on a successful
consolidation of democracy and a solution to the problems of civil-military relations.
In addition, it seems that the tradition in Russian history will continue and the
military in Russia will not take power for itself. The danger to democracy in Russia comes
not from the threat of military coups, however, but from the possibility that the military
may participate in coalitions with pro-communist or radical right political forces wanting
to destabilize the status quo or the development of democratic structures.
Furthermore, the present Russian government should analyse the German case to
find some answers to the problems of democratization and civil-military relations. But
Russia must keep in mind the historical context and the specific circumstances of
democratization as well as Innere Fuhrung in Germany after World War II. The central
problem is whether Russia will be able to establish a viable democracy like the Federal
Republic of Germany after World War II or will relapse into authoritarianism,
post-totalitarianism or even totalitarianism and a passion for empire-building and
hegemony, like Nazi Germany after the failure of the Weimar Republic. This is really a
problem because contemporary Russia seems more comparable with the Weimar Republic
than with the Federal Republic of Germany.
20
Staar, Richard. The New Military in Russia. Ten Myths that Shape the Image. Annapolis, Maryland
Naval Institute Press, 1996, p. 14.
IL ASPECTS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS -
THEORY
This chapter gives a theoretical background which is necessary for the analysis of
civil-military relations and its problems, and of transition toward and consolidation of
democracy. But it can only underline some selected issues because the topic is very
complex, controversial, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union in a process of
development again. Therefore, this chapter focuses on two important theories of
civil-military relations as examples : Huntington's concept of professionalism, the basic
analysis of soldiers and the state after World War II, and Bracken's concept of
organizational design or subsystems, a rethinking of the concept of professionalism in the
post-cold war era. 21 Furthermore, this chapter defines the terms of transition and
consolidation and examines the problems and challenges concerning transition toward and
consolidation of democracy.
A. CrVTL-MILITARY RELATIONS
Civil-military relations theory emerged in the 1950s, and its key concept was
Huntington's concept of professionalism.
The military's degree of professionalization and the kind of civilian control
exerted on the military were the factors that determined the tension
between the state and society and the military. Civilian control either could
be based on subordination to an ideology, class, or shared civilian values,
or it could be based on professionalism and autonomy within the military
spere. When professionalization was at a high level, and when military
issues were strictly separated from civil ones, civilian control would be
maximized. In this condition, coups would not take place, and undue
military influence on state and society would not be a major problem
21
Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Militarv
Relations .Cambridge and London : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957; and Bracken,
Paul, "Reconsidering Civil-Military Relations," in Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton- Carcw
(editors), U.S. Civil-Militarv Relations - In Crisis or Transition ? Washington, D.C. : The Center for
Strategic and International Studies. 1995, pp. 145-165.
because the military would confine itself to its own restricted professional
concerns.
22
1. Professionalism
The fundamental thesis of Huntington's concept of professionalism is that the
modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer is a
professional man. "The existence of the officer corps as a professional body gives a unique
cast to the modern problem of civil-military relations." 23 Huntington defines three
distinguishing characteristics of a profession : 24 (1) Expertise - Perhaps Harold Lasswell
best summed up the special expertise or central skill of military officers as the
management of violence
15
(2) Responsibility - The motivations of the officer are
technical love for his craft and the sense of social obligation to utilize this craft for the
benefit of society. The principal responsibility of the military officer is to the state. (3)
Corporateness - The professional world of the officer tends to encompass an unusually
high proportion of his activities.
2. Subjective and Objective Civilian Control
Huntington examines two broad types of civilian control : subjective civilian
control which maximizes civilian power, and objective civilian control which maximizes
military professionalism. Then he differentiates between two levels of civil-military
relations ~ power level and ideological level ~ and defines several patterns of civil-military
relations.
22 Bracken, p. 145.
23 Huntington, The Soldier and the State , p. 7.
24
Ibid, pp. 8-18.
25
Ibid, p. 11.
10
Subjective civilian control is, indeed, the only form of civilian control
possible in the absence of a professional officer corps. In its various
historical manifestations, subjective civilian control has been identified with
the maximization of the power of particular governmental institutions,
particular social classes, and particular constitutional forms. 26
The rise of the military profession, however, while making the particular forms of
subjective civilian control obsolete, also made possible objective civilian control as a new
and more meaningful definition of civilian control. Objective civilian control means
maximizing military professionalism. Subjective civilian control exists in a variety of forms.
In contrast, objective civilian control exist only in one form — professionalism.
The antithesis of objective civilian control is military participation in
politics: civilian control decreases as the military become progressively
involved in institutional, class, and constitutional politics. Subjective
civilian control, on the other hand, presupposes this involvement. The
essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous
military professionalism; the essence of subjective civilian control is the
denial of an independent military sphere. 27
Objective civilian control achieves the reduction of military power by
professionalizing the military, by rendering them politically sterile and neutral. If civilian
control is defined in this objective sense, no conflict exists between it and the goal of
military security. In contrast, the subjective definition of civilian control presupposes a
conflict between civilian control and the needs of military security. The achievment of
objective civilian control has only been possible, of course, since the emergence of the
military profession.
The conditions which are likely to maximize military professionalism and objective
civilian control depend upon the relation between the two levels of civil-military relations.
26
Ibid., p. 81.
27
Ibid, p. 83.
11
On the power level, the key issue is the power of the officer corps relative
to the civilian groups within society. On the ideological level, the key issue
is the compatibility of the professional military ethic with the political
ideologies prevailing in society. 2*
Huntington compares four ideologies with the military ethic : liberalism, fascism,
Marxism, and conservatism. 29 In a society dominated by an antimilitary ideology
(liberalism, fascism, or Marxism), military professionalism and civilian control are
maximized by the military's renouncing authority and influence and leading a weak,
isolated existance, divorced from the general life of society. By contrast, in a society
dominated by an ideology favorable to the military viewpoint, military power may be
increased to a much greater extent without becoming incompatible with a high level of
professionalism. Then he explains eight ideal and extreme types of civil-military relations
concerning the general relations among ideology, power, and professionalism. He
underlines that in actual practice the civil-military relations of any society combines
elements oftwo or more. 30
But his types are not very useful in the analysis of civil-military relations and its
problems and / or in the comparison of states. First, the types are too ideal and extreme.
They also do not include the very important ideology of nationalism as well as a
differentiation between authoritarian and totalitarian systems.
Second, the analysis of Prussia / Germany is only right concerning Nazi Germany
during World War II ~ (5) antimilitary ideology, low military political power, low military
professionalism, and Prussia / Germany during the Bismarckian-Moltkean epoch (1860 -
28
Ibid, p. 85.
29
Ibid, pp. 90-94.
30 Huntington says that (1) antimilitary ideology, high military political power, high military
professionalism is impossible given the theoretical premises stated above, and (2) promilitary ideology,
low military political power, low military professionalism as well as (3) promilitary ideology, high
military political power, low military professionalism are unlikely to occur except in the most unusual
circumstances.
Furthermore, two types presuppose low professionalism and subjective civilian control, and three types
permit a high degree of professionalism and objective civilian control : (4) antimilitary ideology, high
military political power, low military professionalism; (5) antimilitary ideology, low military political
power, low military professionalism; (6) antimilitary ideology, low military political power, high military
professionalism; (7) promilitary ideology, high military political power, high military professionalism; (8)
promilitary ideology, low military political power, high military professionalism.
12
1890) ~ (7) promilitary ideology, high military political power, high military
professionalism.
Third, his analysis of Germany during World War I — (5) antimilitary ideology,
high military political power, low military professionalism ~ is questionable. It seems more
likely that Imperial Germany in the era of emperor Wilhelm II was characterized by a
promilitary ideology, e.g., the naval construction programme (Admiral Tirpitz's
Flottenpolitik).
Fourth, Huntington argues that one type ~ (3) antimilitary ideology, high military
political power, low military professionalism ~ is unlikely to occur except in the most
unusual circumstances. But the Weimar Republic from 1918 - 1926 (German Reichswehr
as a state within a state with an important influence inside the first German democracy) as
well as the Weimar Republic from 1926 - 1933 (German Reichswehr as faction among
factions inside the first German democracy) are important examples for this type.
3. Reconsidering Civil-Military Relations
Bracken argues that it is necessary to reconsider the concept of professionalism to
solve the problems of civil-military relations in the post-cold war era because the situation
has changed dramatically
:
... looking at civil-military problems with these outmoded frameworks
produces a repetition of old problems regardless of their relevance to the
post-cold war world. ... There has been little interest in the enormous
variety of civil-military relationship and their contextual dependency, nor
in the extraordinary complexity of modern military forces. In addition,
some of the most important and interesting aspects of civil-military
relations are neglected because they cannot be discussed in the
terminology of professionalization. 31
He underlines that boundaries between civilians and the military could not be
drawn in advance because civilian leaders and the military need to work together. In
modern societies the greatly enlarged civilian and military staffs must work together to
31
Bracken., pp. 145-146.
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solve the problems of security (externally) and civil-military relations (internally) ~
problems that were neither strictly civil nor strictly military.
The very division of the problem into two broad parts ~ civil and military
~ created a tension that was an artifact of the construct. It suggested a
search for a dividing line to sort problems into one of two arenas, civil or
military. This is not what happened. 32
Furthermore, Western theories of communist civil-military relations fare so badly
because absent from most accounts of Soviet civil-military relations was its organization.
Twice in this century, the Russian officer corps watched the disintegration of the Russian
state without taking any action until it was too late to matter. The Russian military
behaved like a bureaucracy, with its penchant for inertia and delay. "In looking back on
civil-military relations frameworks it is striking how a fixation on typologies missed the
most ubiquitous organizational type in the modern world, the bureaucracy."33
One way to analyse civil-military relations is to view them as being made up of
large subsystems. Bracken analyses four subsystems as the most critical civil-military
subsystems
:
(1) budgetary;
(2) the industrial base and its tie to the military;
(3) the uniformed military itself, both officer and enlisted;
(4) the civilian leadership.
34
He argues that the post-cold war era is especially problematic because the old
balances among these four subsystems were defined for a competition and an international
environment that no longer exist.
A central problem of post-cold war civil-military relations is the extent to
which these subsystems can be realigned for the new environment.
Extreme misalignment among them could reflect a disintegration of the
32
Ibid, p. 152.
33
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coordinating mechanisms that control military-state relationship. ... the key
to successful civil-military relations is to achieve a basic alignment among
these key subsystems. 35
Bracken argues that the study of civil-military relations today is badly in need of
new theoretical thinking, as it was in the 1950s. The frameworks developed then helped
illuminate some important issues, and they provided a vocabulary that allowed
sophisticated discussion of key problems in the field. What is needed to do ?
First, the emphasis that different problems receive has to change with the
changing contexts. Second, a more organizationally grounded set of
concepts that emphasize the relationship among things like mission,
technology, task structure, and organizational structure would be a very
useful advance beyond the overused, and misused, concept of
professionalization. Finally, a more expansive interpretation of the field
would open up new areas of great importance to analytical investigation. 36
Ffis analysis is a step foward in the theory of civil-military relations in the post-cold
war era. But Bracken also fails to analyse the problems and challenges concerning the
integration of armed forces and soldiers into state and society. In Russia this means first of
all to solve social and ethnic problems inside both the society as well as the armed forces.
Democracy is a form of governance of a state. Thus no modern polity can
become democratically unless it is first a state. Therefore, the inexistence
of a state or such an intense lack of identification with the state that large
groups of individuals in the territory want to join a different state or create
an independent state raises fundamental and often unsolvable problems. ...
stateness problems are so basic, and so underanalyzed ... , however, ...
without the existence of a state, there cannot be a consolidated modern
democratic regime. 37
35
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Stateness is the prerequisite for democracy, and the successful solution of ethnic
problems is the prerequisite for stateness in the long run; therefore, the successful solution
of ethnic problems is the conditio sine qua non for democracy. 38 This underlines the
serious lack of theory in general because the soldier's responsibility towards the state,
society and democracy depends not least on the identification of the soldier with the state,
society, and democracy. Without this identification the soldier never will become a
Protector ofDemocracy in his country.
B. TRANSITION TOWARDS DEMOCRACY
In this century Germany ~ in comparison to Russia « has made experiences with
transition towards democracy in three cases : Weimar Republic in 1918 / 1919, Federal
Rebublic of Germany (FRG) in 1949, and German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1989 /
1990.
"Transition in regime type implies movement from something toward something
else."
39 Successful transition means the swift movement from one non-democratic political
system toward democracy. "In any case, the transition is over when abnormality is no
longer the central feature of political life ... h4° Guillermo OTDonnell and Philippe C.
Schmitter define the first open elections as the end of transition. This definition is a
minimalist one. By contrast, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan use a more complex definition.
A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been
reached about political procedures to produce an elected government,
when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and
popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate
38 Concerning the importance of ethnic issues and problems see, e.g. : Enloe, Cynthia H., Ethnic
Soldiers. State Security in Divided Societies , Athens : The University of Georgia Press, 1980; Karklins,
Rasme, Ethnopolitics and Transition to Democracy. The Collapse of the USSR and Latvia, Washington
DC, The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994; Laba, Roman, "How Yeltsin's Exploitation of Ethnic
Nationalism Brought Down an Empire," Transition, vol. 2, no. 1, 12 January 1996, pp. 5-13.
39 O'Donnell, Guillermo and Schmitter, Philippe C, Transition from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies , Baltimore and London : The Johns Hopkins University Press,
Fourth Impression, 1993, p. 65.
40
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new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power
generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other
bodies dejure. 41
Huntington analyses three different types of transition to democracy :
(1) transformation;
(2) replacement;
(3) transplacement.
42
1. Transformation
This type of transition occurs when the elites in power take the lead in bringing
about democracy. The transformation requires the government to be stronger than the
opposition. Consequently, transformations occur in well-established military regimes
where governments clearly control the ultimate means of coercion as well as authoritarian
systems which are successful economically. The prototypical cases of transformation are
Spain, Brazil, and Hungary.
The Soviet Union was neither a military regime nor successful economically. But
the Soviet Union / Russia is also an important case of transformation because of Mikhail
Gorbachev's policy ofGLASNOST and PERESTROIKA from 1985 to 1991.
2. Replacement
Replacements occur when opposition groups take the lead in bringing about
democracy, and the authoritarian regime collapses or is overthrown. Reformers within the
regime are weak or non-existent. The dominant elements in government are standpatters
staunchly opposed to the regime. Democratization consequently results from the
opposition gaining strength. The former opposition groups then come to power and the
Linz and Stepan, p. 3.
42
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conflict then often enters a new phase as groups in the new government struggle among
themselves over the nature of the regime they should institute. Only six replacements had
occurred by 1990 : Argentina, Greece, Portugal, the Philippines, Romania, and the
German Democratic Republic (GDR).
3. Transplacement
Transplacements occur when democratization results largely from joint action by
government and opposition groups. In this third type of transition the balance between
standpatters and reformers is such that the government is willing to negotiate a change of
regime but is unwilling to initiate a change of regime. It has to be pushed and/or pulled
into formal or informal negotiations with the opposition. The democratic moderators are
strong enough to prevail over antidemocratic radicals, but they are not strong enough to
overthrow the government. Eleven of thirty-five liberalizations and democratizations that
occured or began in the 1970s and 1980s approximated this model of transition. The most
notable ones were in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Uruguay, and Korea; the regime changes in
Bolivia, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua also involved significant elements of
transplacement.
Concerning the first German democracy in 1918/ 1919 — Weimar Republic ~ it
is very difficult to identify the type of transition toward democracy. An analysis of the
Weimar Republic later on will underline that the transition was a result of at least two
types of transition, replacement (November Revolution in Germany in 1918) and
intervention (the threat of an allied occupation of Germany at the end of World War I).
After World War II in West Germany ~ since 1949 Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG) ~ the prerequisite for transition towards democracy came from outside by
intervention. "Virtually the only path in which totalitarianism defeated in war could lead
rapidly to a democratic regime is by occupation by a democratic regime and externally
monitored democratic installation."43
Linz and Stepan, p. 57.
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C. CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY
Linz and Stepan define a consolidated democracy as a political situation in which
democracy has become behaviorally, attitudinally, and constitutionally the only game in
town.
44
- Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no
significant national, economic, political, or institutional actors spend
significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a
nondemocratic regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention to
secede from the state.
- Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority
of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and
institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a
society such as theirs and when the support for antisystem alternatives is
quite small or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces.
- Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental
and nongovernmental forces alike, throughout the territory of the state,
become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within
the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new
democratic process.45
Furthermore, Linz and Stepan argue that democracy is a form of governance of a
state and that the problem of stateness is underanalysed. This is an important gap in theory
because without the existence of a state, there cannot be a consolidated modern
democratic system.
If a functioning state exists, five other interconnected and mutually reinforcing
conditions must also exist or be crafted for a democracy to be consolidated.
46 The
conditions must exist for a development of a free and lively civil society. Furthermore,
there must be a relatively autonomous and valued political society; a rule of law to ensure
legal guarantees for citizens' freedoms and independent associational life; a state
44
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bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic government, and an institutionalized
economic society.
By contrast, Huntington explains that countries of the third wave of
democratization (1974 until today) have three types of problems in developing and
consolidating their new democracies :
(1) transition problems;
(2) contextual problems;
(3) systemic problems.
47
His analysis also gives a very useful background to analyse the unsuccessful
consolidation of democracy in the Weimar Republic (1918 - 1933).
1. Transition Problems
Transition problems stem directly from the phenomenon of regime change from
authoritarianism to democracy. "They included the problems of establishing new
constitutional and electoral systems, weeding out proauthoritarian officials and replacing
them with democratic ones, repealing or modifying laws that were unsuitable for
democracy, abolishing or drastically changing authoritarian agencies such as the secret
police, and, in former one-party systems, separating party and government property,
functions, and personnel."48 Huntington underlines two key transition problems. First, how
to treat authoritarian officials who had blatantly violated human rights ~ the torturer
problem. Second, how to reduce military involvement in politics and establish a
professional pattern of civil-military relations — the praetorian problem. New democratic
regimes have to decide what to do with the symbols, doctrines, organizations, laws, civil
servants, and leaders of the authoritarian system. "How should the democratic government
respond to charges of gross violations of human rights—murder, kidnapping, torture, rape,
imprisonment without trial—committed by the officials of the authoritarian regimes ?"49
47
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This decision concerns the torturer problem : to prosecute and punish versus to forgive
and forget. "In Eastern Europe, apart from Romania and East Germany, the initial overall
tendency was to forgive and forget." 50
The torturer problem overlapes with an politically more serious problem
confronting many new democracies : the need to curb the political power of the military
establishment and to make the armed forces into a professional body committed to
providing for the external security of the country. This key-problem of civil-military
relations concerns five aspects of armed forces in democracies : professionalism, mission,
leadership and organization, size and equipment, and status. 51
2. Contextual Problems
This second category of problems stems from the nature of the society, its
economy, culture, and history, and were in some degree endemic to the country, whatever
its form of government. The authoritarian rulers did not resolve these problems and, in all
probability, neither would the democratic rulers. "In fact, however, apart from a low level
of economic development, the number and severity of a country's contextual problems
appeared to be only modestly related to its success or failure in consolidating
democracy." 52 Third wave democracies have eight major contextual problems : major
insurgencies, ethnic/communal conflicts (apart from insurgencies), extreme poverty (low
per capita GNP), severe socio-economic inequality, chronic inflation, substantial external
debt, terrorism (apart from insurgency), and extensive state involvement in the economy. 53
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3. Systemic Problems
This third category of problems stems from the working of a democratic system.
Authoritarian political systems suffer from problems that derive from their particular
nature, such as overly concentrated decision making, deficient feedback, dependence on
performance legitimacy. Other problems tend to be peculiarly characteristic of democratic
systems : stalemate, the inability to reach decisions, susceptibility to demagoguery,
domination by vested economic interests. These problems have afflicted long-standing
democracies, and new third wave democracies presumably would not be immune to
them. 54
To recapitulate, this chapter focused on some selected issues of theory to get an
understanding about civil-military relations and its problems in the process of
democratization. It is important to keep in mind two main aspects from these theoretical
perspectives before analyzing the cases of Germany and Russia.
(1) The theories of civil-military relations fail to analyse the problems and
challenges concerning the integration of armed forces and soldiers into state and society.
Future theories should define and analyse civil-military relations as a triangle between
state, society, and armed forces which balances and guarantees the following three
aspects:
- civilian control / civilian supremacy over the military in general;
- civil-military cooperation concerning national security issues;
- integration of the armed forces and soldiers into state and society.
(2) The process of democratization and the study of civil-military relations must
not end with the successful transition towards democracy. A viable democracy rather
depends on a successful consolidation of democracy and a solution to the problems of
civil-military relations. Especially the analysis of German history will underline this
important aspect.
5i
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ffl. ASPECTS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS -
GERMAN HISTORY
Another prerequisite to get an understanding of civil-military relations and the
concept of Innere Fuhrung in present Germany — besides the theoretical background
given in chapter II ~ is knowledge of Prussian / German militarism and civil-military
relations in German history; therefore, this chapter gives an historical overview of
civil-military relations and its problems in German history. It underlines problems of
civil-military relations and the influence of the military in Germany from the beginning of
professionalization until the catastrophe of the Third Reich. 55 Furthermore, it explains
some reasons and experiences concerning successful transition toward and unsuccessful
consolidation of democracy in the Weimar Republic (1918-1933).
A. PRUSSIA
The profession of officership was essentially a product of the 19th century and one
of the most significant institutional creations of that century. This emergence of a
professional officer corps created the modern problem of civil-military relations in Europe
and North America because of the fundamental transformation in the first part of the 1
8
th
century. "To Prussia goes the distinction of originating the professional officer." 56 The
great Prussian reforms mark the beginning of military professionalism in the West.
Gerhard von Scharnhorst and August Count Neidhardt von Gneisenau, not Frederick the
Great and his father, were the true founders of the modern Prussian / German Army.
Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-MIlitarv
Relations . Cambridge and London : The Belknap Press ofHarvard University Press, 1957, pp. 19-58 and
98-124 gives a very good summary; see also, e.g.: Kitchen, Martin, The German Officer Corps
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The disastrous defeat of the old army in 1 806 meant that a drastic reform
of its structure and organization could no longer be postponed, and even
the arch-conservatives realized that Prussia could not be saved from her
humilitating situation without fundamental changes in the military system.
In Stein, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Boyen and Grolman, Prussia had
statesmen and soldiers who were admirably equipped to instigate such
reforms, inspired by a vision that went far beyond the purely military
problem of freeing Prussia from French domination. The reform realized
that the central problem was political rather than military.57
In addition, it was a Prussian, Carl von Clausewitz, who contributed in On War the
theoretical rationale for the new profession and the first theoretical justification of civilian
control.
58
1. Prussian Military Professionalism, 1808-1870
Perhaps the birth of the military profession occured on 6 August 1808. On that day
the Prussian government issued its decree on the appointment of officers which set forth
the basic standard of professionalism with uncompromising clarity :
The only title to an officer's commission shall be, in time of peace,
education andprofessional knowledge; in time ofwar, distinguished valor
and perception. From the entire nation, therefore, all individuals who
possess these qualities are eligible for the highest military posts. All
previously existing class preference in the military establishment is
abolished, and every man, without regard to his origins, has equal duties
and equal rights 59
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While all the nations of Europe by 1875 had aquired the basic elements of military
professionalism, in Prussia alone were these elements developed into a complete system.
The elements of the Prussian system were as follows : (1) requirements of general and
special educations; (2) examinations and institutions for higher military education, (3) an
elaborate and efficient staff system; (4) a sense of corporate unity and responsibility; (5) a
recognition of the limits of professional competence. 60
The answer why Prussia took the lead in such a manner is to be found in the
general causes responsible for the emergence of professionalism in Europe and in the
peculiar extent to which they were present in Prussia. There were four main factors : 61
(1) technological specialization;
(2) competitive nationalism;
(3) conflict between democracy and aristocracy;
(4) presence of stable legitimate authority over the military forces.
The rise of nationalism and democracy had one important product which was
closely linked to the emergence of professionalism. This was the concept of the nation in
arms and its corollary of a national army. Prussia, the first country to professionalize her
officer corps, was also the first to introduce permanent universal service on 3 September
1814. In the reversal of roles which took place in the 19* century, the enlisted men became
a cross section of the national population and the officers became a separate professional
group living in a world of their own with few ties to outside society.
The evolution of professional methods of entry went through three phases : 62
(1) the elimination of aristocratic prerequisites for entry;
(2) the requirement of a basic level of professional training and competence;
(3) the requirement of a minimum general education and the provision of this
education in institutions not operated by the military.
The establishment of professional standards for entry into the officer corps was
followed by the establishment of professional standard for advancement within the corps.
60
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In general, the new advancement system took the form of promotion by seniority
tempered by selection. In Prussia, for example, Scharnhorst introduced the idea of
examination as a prerequisite to promotion and raised the pay of officers so as to decrease
their reliance upon outside income. Able officers were advanced rapidly in the General
Staff.
As the science of war increased in scope and complexity, institutions for its
advanced study became increasingly necessary. Prussia recognized this long before any
other power, and in 1810 Scharnhorst established the famous Kriegsakademie in Berlin.
This war academy was the focal institution of Prussian professionalism.
The primacy of Prussia was most obvious in the development of a professional
staff. The Prussian general staff dates from 25 November 1803. But it never had the
opportunity to function effectively prior to the defeat of Prussia by Napoleon. In 1808
Scharnhorst reorganized the staff, and throughout the 19* century the General Staff tended
to be the organizational stronghold of Prussian professionalism. Under the leadership of
Helmuth Count von Moltke, who became its chief in 1857, the General Staff rapidly
acquired preeminence.
Moltke became the dominant ideal of the German officer corps. From the 1860 s
on, service in the General Staff was the most coveted duty in the German Army. The
wine-red trouser stripe of the General Staff officer became the symbol of a new elite
within the officer corps, the cream of the profession, signifying the highest standards of
knowledge, competence, and devotion to duty. Moltke s famous injunction to his General
Staff officers was as follows :
Always be more thanyou seem ! 63
Probably the most revolutionary aspect of the Prussian system was its assumption
that genius was superfluous, and even dangerous, and that reliance must be placed upon
average men succeeding by superior education, organization, and experience. This was the
antithesis of the 18 th century theory ofthe military genius.
63
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2. Clausewitz's On War
The new conditions required a new theory which received its first comprehensive
and explicit formulation in On War64 by Clausewitz, published posthumously in 1831.
Clausewitz had been an assistant to Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in the work of military
reform, and he wrote his book during his tour as director of the War Academy in the years
after 1815. "In formulating the first theoretical rationale for the military profession,
Clausewitz also contributed the first theoretical justification of civilian control."65
Clausewitz's views on tactics and principles of strategy, however, are not the most
important aspects of On War. "His significant contribution occurs at a higher level of
analysis and concerns the inherent nature of war and the relation of war to other forms of
human activity."66 Clausewitz's theory concerning the nature of war is the most important
aspect concerning civil-military relations.
The basic element in Clausewitz's theory is his concept of the dual nature
of war. War is at one and the same time an autonomous science with its
own method and goals and yet a subordinate science in that its own
ultimate purposes come from outside itself. This concept of war is a true
professional one ...
67
Furthermore, Clausewitz expresses many other and secondary elements of the
professional military ethic. But his seminal contribution is his concept of the dual nature of
war and the role of the soldier. Given this, virtually all the other aspects of professionalism
must necessarily follow.
For Clausewitz the essence ofwar when considered as an independent science, as a
thing in itselfKrieg an sich, is force. "War is thus an act of force to compel our adversary
64
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to do our will."68 War in this sense permits of no limitation because "...to overcome the
enemy, or disarm him ~ call it what you will — must always be the aim of warfare." 69
Liddell Hart refers to Clausewitz as "The Mahdi ofmass and mutual massacre and
the source of the doctrine of absolute war, ' the fight to the finish theory"
70
In
Huntington's view this is a misinterpretation of Clausewitz ~ and Huntington is right.
Only when considered abstractly, in theory, independent of all else, war is
violence without limit. In practice, war is never an isolated act. Force is not
an end in itself. It is only justified when it is rationally employed for public
purpose. War is always subordinate to the external political ends which
determine the extent and nature ofthe violence to be employed. The results
ofwar are never absolute. 71
For Clausewitz there was no doubt about it that the soldier must always be
subordinate to the stateman (Primat der Politik).
War is merely the continuation of policy by other means. . . . The political
object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be
considered in isolation from their purpose. 72
B. IMPERIAL GERMANY
Germany inherited from Prussia the most professional officer corps in Europe. Its
central elements were the General Staff and the Kriegsakademie. German institutional
professionalism had its counterpart in the dominance of the professional ethic in the
German military mind. The two outstanding military leaders of Germany ~ Helmuth Count
von Moltke who was Chief of Staff from 1857-1888 and Alfred von Schlieffen who
68
Clausewitz, On War, p. 75.
69
Ibid, p. 77.
70 Quoted by Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 57.
71
Ibid, p. 57.
72
Clausewitz, On War, p. 87.
28
occupied the same post from 1891 to 1905 — were both disciples of Clausewitz. It was
accepted gospel in the officer corps that war was an instrument of politics and therefore
the soldier was the junior partner ofthe stateman. 73
The First World War saw the complete destruction of the imperial balance in civil-
military relations. By the end of the war the General Staff was running the German
government. "Battle transforms generals into heroes; the heroes transform themselves into
politicians; and the result is a loss of professional military restraint and caution."74
1. Imperial Balance, 1870-1914
Moltke was more politically aware than Schlieffen but he had no political ambitions
and restricted himself to vigorous presentation of the military viewpoint. His guiding ideal
was that of an unpolitical army.
The commander in his operations ... has to keep military victory as the
goal before his eyes. But what statemanship does with his victories or
defeats is not his province. It is that ofthe stateman
15
Even more than Moltke, Schlieffen avoided politics and devoted himself and the
General Staff to strictly military matters. He was the military technician par excellence, and
he created the Schlieffen-Plan. That strategy was designed to cope with what the military
viewed as the nightmare situation of a two-front war which would require a quick and
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decisive victory on one front. As the General Staff declared in a confidential statement of
1902,
We want to conquer nothing, we merely want to defend what we own. We
shall probably never be attackers but rather always be the attacked. The
necessary quick success can be brought us with certainty only by the
offensive
16
The German military indeed manifested an almost pathological concern for national
security. Far from advocating war, the military leaders generally viewed it as the last resort
of policy and looked foward to it with gloomy forebodings and feverish preparations.
2. Military Dictatorship, 1914-1918
The involvement of the General Staff in politics began during Erich von
Falkenhayn's tenure as its chief from the fall of 1914 to August 1916 (the defeat at
Verdun). This was, however, merely a prelude to the virtually absolute power which Paul
von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff exercised in the last two years of the war when the
former replaced Falkenhayn and the latter became First Quatermaster General. The
fundamental element in this tremendous expansion of military control was the
unprecedented popularity of the victor of Tannenberg with the German people.
Hindenburg was a national idol whom the Germans trusted implicitly to bring them
success.
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In 1918 Hindenburg and Ludendorff were able to secure the dismissal of the chief
of the Emperor's Civil Cabinet. The other military officers were similarly subordinated to
the will of the General Staff.
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C. WEIMAR REPUBLIC
In the Weimar Republic78 (1918-1933) the overall process of democratization was
very complex and prolonged. By using O'Donnell's and Schmitter's definition the
transition from Imperial Germany toward the first German democracy Weimar was
successful. There were open elections in Weimar and a democratic constitution. But
Weimar never was a consolidated democracy.
It is difficult to identify the type of transition toward democracy in Weimar
because of four main problems at the end ofthe First World War. First, the Great War was
definitely lost. Second, the German military still had a strong position in the government,
and the defeated German Armed Forces got a warm welcome from the population. Third,
the outbreak of the November Revolution in 1918 and the involvement of the Armed
Forces. Fourth, the threat of an allied invasion. Therefore, the transition in Weimar was a
result of two types ~ replacement and intervention. The military permitted or at least
tolerated the transition towards democracy. The military leaders, first of all Hindenburg
(later President from 1925-1934) and the General Staff linked the responsibility of the lost
Great War with liberal and democratic forces in Germany (the "stab-in-the-back" myth -
Dolchstofilegende). This was a tremendous burden for all democratic forces during the
entire Weimar Republic.
Furthermore, during the Weimar Republic all three problems of consolidation of
democracy ~ transition problems, contextual problems, and systemic problems — were not
solved. There were two key transition problems that Weimar never solved. First, the
responsibility for World War I (Kriegsschuldfrage) and especially the responsibility of the
German military leaders. Second, the need to reduce the military involvement in politics
and establish a professional pattern of civil-military relations. Germany was beaten but not
destroyed in 1918-1919. The military leaders linked the responsibility of the Great War
with international circumstances, first of all with the German faith to the treaty with
78
See, e.g. : Herzfeld, Hans, Die Weimarer Republic, Walther Hubatsch (editor), Deutsche Geschichte.
Ercignissc und Probleme. Band 6, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin und Wien : Ullstein, 4. Auflage 1975;
Heiber, Helmut, Die Republik von Weimar , Martin Broszat und Helmut Heiber (editors),
dtv-Wcltgeschichtc des 20. Jahrhunderts, Miinchen (GE) : Deutscher Taschenbuchvcrlag, 9. Auflage
1976; Bessel, Richard, Germany after the First World War, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1993.
31
Austria-Hungary and the great, successful fight against Russian despotism. Furthermore,
the military leaders linked the responsibility of the defeat in the West with the liberal and
democratic forces in Germany. Because of both the German military was able to hold a
special position during Weimar.
Also the Weimar Republic was confronted with several of the eight major
contextual problems confronting democracies during their consolidation : major
insurgencies, ethnic/communal conflicts (apart from insurgencies), extreme poverty (low
per capita GNP), severe socio-economic inequality, chronic inflation, substantial external
debt, terrorism (apart from insurgency), and extensive state involvement in the economy.
For example, the Weimar Republic was confronted with the Treaty of Versailles in 1919;
several assaults against political leaders of Weimar from the extreme left side as well as
from the extreme right side during the first years of Weimar - the death of Rathenau in
1922; the Kapp-Putsch in 1920; unrest of the extreme left forces especially between 1919
and 1923 - Ruhrkdmpfe, paramilitary groups outside the regular armed forces during the
entire Weimar era; inflation - occupation of the Ruhr/Rhineland - general strike in 1923;
the trial of the extreme right forces who had attempted to overthrow the government in
1923 - Hitler-Putsch, the Great Depression in 1929; and the elections in 1930 - NSDAP =
18.6% ofthe Reichstag.
Furthermore, the Weimar Republic never solved the systemic problems either in
the government or in the public opinion. There were too many parties, sometimes over
thirty, and these parties were in the spectrum from the extreme left to the extreme right;
therefore, it was very difficult for the democratic forces to reach necessary majorities.
Last but not least, the constitution of the Weimar Republic included the famous
Art. 48 (emergency-decree power of the President). Especially at the end of the Weimar
Republic during 1930 - 1933 the chancellors, supported by Reichspresident Hindenburg,
resorted to Art. 48 of the constitution to carry on governing. The chancellors ~ first of all
Heinrich Briining from 1930 to 1932 — and Hindenburg used Art. 48 to make laws outside
the decision-making process of the parliament. President and chancellors bypassed the
Weimar Reichstag by using Art. 48 and took the first step that facilitated the rise of Hitler
and German dictatorship.
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The Weimar Republic practiced two different methods in foreign policy concerning
the Treaty of Versailles : the policy of resistance (Ruhr 1923), and the policy of
fulfillment. In this context the two most important aspects were the French and Belgian
occupation of the Ruhr (1923) and the Treaty of Locarno (1925) with Germany's entry
into the League of Nations in 1926. The occupation of the Ruhr isolated France, and the
Treaty of Locarno as well as the League of Nations opened for Germany the way to the
international community.
In January 1923, French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr, Germany's
industrial heartland, without consulting the other Allies. David Lloyd George said many
years later : "If there had been no Rapallo, there would have been no Ruhr" 19 The
German government ordered passive resistance and paid the coal and steal workers not to
work. "Though the policy bankruped the German government — and sparked
hyperinflation ~ it also prevented France from achieving its objective, thereby turning the
occupation of the Ruhr into a massive failure." 80 The occupation of the Ruhr ended in the
fall of 1923. Inflation raged, threatening the ability ofthe German government to carry out
any of its obligations. France's insistence on full reparations had become unfulfillable as a
result of French actions. Furthermore, France and Great Britain had managed to
checkmate each other : France, by insisting on weakening Germany by unilateral action
and thereby forfeiting British support; Great Britain, by insisting on conciliation without
considering its impact on the balance of power, thereby forfeiting French security. "Even a
disarmed Germany proved strong enough to thwart unilateral French actions ~ an augury
ofwhat lay ahead once Germany threw off the shackles of Versailles." 81
By the end of 1923 Gustav Stresemann became Foreign Minister. His method for
renewing Germany's strength was the so called policy offulfillment, which amounted to a
total reversal of previous German policy. Stresemann was the first postwar German leader
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who exploited the geopolitical advantages which the Treaty of Versailles conferred with
Germany.
He grasped the essentially brittle nature of the Franco-English relationship,
and used it to widen the wedge between the two wartime allies. He
cleverly exploited the British fear of a German collapse vis-a-vis both
France and the Soviet Union. 82
If fulfillment succeeded, Germany would become progressively stronger and be in
a position to threaten the equilibrium of Europe. "The policy offulfillment was bound to
bring closer the day described by General von Seeckt : We must regain our power, and as
soon as we do, we will naturally take back everything we lost. "83
The Locarno Pact (1925) was greeted with exuberant relief as the dawning of a
new world order. "But amidst all the jubilation, no one noticed that the statesmen had
sidestepped the real issues; Locarno had not so much pacified Europe as it had defined the
next battlefield."
84 Locarno in fact marked the beginning of the end of the Versailles
international order.
The wartime Allies had all abdicated their responsibilities ~ America
shirked its role in designing the peace, Great Britain renounced its historic
role as balancer, and France relinquished its responsibility as guardian of
the Versailles settlement. Only Stresemann, leader of the defeated
Germany, had a long-range policy, and he inexorably moved his country to
the center of the international stage. 85
In 1926 Germany entered the League of Nations. Stresemann skillfully used
Germany's entry into the League both to increase his options toward the Soviet Union and
to intensify German pressure on France for parity in armaments. Within a year of Locarno,
in 1926, a treaty of neutrality between the Soviet Union and Germany was signed in
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Berlin. "Berlin and Moscow were united in hostility to Poland, as German Chancellor
Wirth told his Ambassador to Moscow, Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau : One thing I tell
you frankly; Poland must be eliminated ... 1 do not conclude any treaty which might
strengthen Poland. " 86
However, unlike his nationalist critics ~ and quite contrary to the Nazis ~
Stresemann relied on patience, compromise, and the blessing of European consensus to
achieve his goals. He saw no need for a violent revision of Versailles. When Stresemann
died on 3 October 1929, Germany had no leader of comparable talent. At the time of
Stresemann s death, the reparations issue was on the way to being resolved, and
Germany's western boarders had been settled. Germany remained revisionist with respect
to its eastern boarders and to the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.
1. State within a State, 1918-1926
The inauguration of the Weimar Republic saw the role of the military change from
complete dominance of the state to essential support for the state. First, in 1918, President
Friedrich Ebert in effect negotiated a treaty with the military leaders receiving the support
of the army in exchange for the suppression of the extreme left. Second, in 1920, during
the Kapp Putsch, the army maintained a wait-and-see neutrality and so underlined again its
power inside the state. Third, three years later when the government was menaced by the
threat of uprisings from both the extreme right and extreme left, the army command
defended republican authority, and exercised emergency power in its behalf.
That the Weimar government existed as long as it did is due to army
support. That support, however, was not something which could be
commanded by the government; it was something which was granted by
the army."
S6
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These examples underline a central problem of the Weimar Republic ~ civilian
control of the Reichswehr n The Weimar Republic never solved this problem. From 1918
to 1926 the Reichswehr was state within a state but with an important political influence
inside the first German democracy. The officer corps in the Weimar Republic retreated
from the ideology of military dictatorship in the direction of the old imperial military ethic.
The dominant figure in the Reichswehr from 1919 until 1926 was General Hans
von Seeckt. The one weak element in Seeckt's formulation of the military ethic was a
certain haziness as to where the ultimate loyalty of the army lay. This reflected the
ambiguity of the Weimar constitution and the political weakness of the republican
government. Seeckt's description ot the place of the army was that the army serves the
state; it is above parties.
The army should become a State within the State, but it should be merged
in the State through service, in fact it should itself become the purest
image of the State
%9
This was fine as far as it went. But it left undefined the relationship of the military
to the government. It was a state within a state, not a professional guild serving a
government. What this meant in practice was well illustrated during the 1923 crisis when
President Ebert asked General Seeckt where the Reichswehr stood. "The Reichswehr, Mr.
President, replied the latter, stands behind me"90 And there were no general principles
which defined where Seeckt stood. At this time he seriously considered assuming
sovereign power himself By refusing to accept the Weimar Republic as the permanent
embodiment of the German state, the leaders of the Reichswehr were required to make
political judgements at any moment of acute crisis. The governments of the Weimar
Republic — often named a democracy without democrats ~ were not able to control the
88 Reichswehr was the name for the German Armed Forces of the Kaiserreich as well as of the Weimar
Republic.
89 Quoted by Huntington, The Soldier and the State , p. 111.
90 Quoted by ibid, p. 112.
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Reichswehr. The Reichswehr did not stand behind democracy but rather behind its own
military and conservative interests.
2. Faction among Factions, 1926-1933
After Seeckt's retirement, his successor, Colonel General Wilhelm Heye, and other
generals such as Wilhelm Groener attempted to carry on his polities. Under Seeckt the
army had been called upon to make political decisions only when there was an acute
constitutional crisis. In contrast, after his departure the army became more and more
involved in the day to day affairs and maneuverings of party politics. "This involvement
was brought about not by any change in the structure of authority but simply by the
willingness of the military leadership to apply the political power of the army to immediate
political ends."91
The two key figures in this change were Hindenburg and General Kurt von
Schleicher. Hindenburg was elected President of the Republic in 1925. The army now
defined loyalty to the state as loyalty to the field marshal and national hero.
Schleicher had been appointed head of the political department of the Defense
Ministry in 1926. Trading upon his influence with Hindenburg and negotiating and dealing
with party politicians of all stripes, he became a key figure in the government, making and
unmaking cabinets with wanton abandon. In 1927, Schleicher eased out the Defense
Minister, Otto Gessler, who had appointed him, and had Groener put in this post.
Subsequently, in 1930, he brought about the fall of the cabinet of Chancellor Hermann
Miiller and the replacement of the latter by Heinrich Bruning. Two years later he
torpedoed Bruning and Groener and secured the appointment of Franz von Papen as
Chancellor. He himself took over the post of Defense Minister. Late in the autumn of
1932, Papen was disposed of; and in December, Schleicher became Chancellor. Generals
now occupied the two highest posts in the government. Later Schleicher paid the price of
failure in totalitarian politics when he was assassinated in the Nazi purge of 30 June 1934.
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His enemies soon combined against Schleicher, however, and, at the end of
January 1933, Hitler succeeded him at the head of a cabinet of Nazis and
nationalists. Under Schleicher the Reichswehr had ceased to be a state
within a state and had become a faction among factions. The generals had
entered into the competition of politics and they had lost. 92
D. THIRD REICH
In January, 1933, Hitler came to power and demonstrated that the Versailles
system had indeed been a house of cards. The following years were characterized by
several international crises. In this context the most important aspects were the
appeasement policy from 1933 until 1939 and the Munich Conference in 1938. 93
The appeasement policy of the Western powers against Germany in the 1930s was
a strategic option with three aims : First, to change Nazi-Germany's behavior. Second, to
satisfy Nazi-Germany with marginal gains which did not threaten the western powers' vital
interests. Third, to buy time to build up forces, strengthen alliances, and initiate a war from
a position of strength. The appeasement policy failed because it was not applied as a
coherent strategy. But in comparison to the First World War and the international
situation of instability and crises this strategy was understandable. The first priority of the
Western powers was to prevent a new Great War.
In contrast, in 1935 Hitler decided to reintroduce general conscription. In 1936
Hitler cancelled the Locarno Pact and ordered the occupation of the demilitarized zone of
the Rhineland. In 1937 Hitler revealed his war aims at the Fuhrerconference (Hofibach
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Memorandum) — additional German living-space (Lebensraum) was to be obtained by the
use of force. In 1938 the world saw the Anschlufi of Austria
At the Munich Conference on 29 September 1938, Hitler, Benito Mussolini,
Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier decided that the Sudeten German areas of
Czechoslovakia were ceded to Germany. Hitler's position was that the cession of the
Sudetenland was his final demand.
The intention of the Western powers was to put an end to German expansioa It
was the last great trial of the Western powers to stop Nazi-Germany without a new Great
War.
It was a terrible problem for the truly conscientious. Should Germany's
wrongs be righted, at risk of strengthening Fascism ? But if her wrongs
were righted, might this not weaken Fascism ? If the German people had
restored to them the rights and the territories of which they had been
deprived by the Versailles Settlement, would not they rejoin the comity of
peace-loving powers, and their militarism wither away ?w
Only three weeks later Hitler decided to liquidate the rump of Czechoslovakia. At
16 March 1939, the German Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was established.
Furthermore, on 23 March 1939, the Memel territory was joined to the German Reich.
Simultaneously the German-Polish relations began to deteriorate. On 1 September 1939,
Germany attacked Poland.
The transition toward an totalitarian system in Germany began in 1930 and was
finished on 30 January 1933 (Hitler's government was sworn in). From 1933 {Reichstag
fire and Law for Removing the Distress of People and Reich ~ the Enabling Act) until
1934 (Rohm-Putsch and death of Hindenburg) Hitler consolidated his totalitarian system
and successfully destroyed the opposition. In comparison to the democracy of the Weimar
Republic the Fiihrer and Reichskanzler Hitler and his Nazis were much more successful in
consolidating their totalitarian system as well as manipulating and fascinating the Germans
including main parts of the German Armed Forces. The result was the second German bid
91 Howard, Michael, War and the Liberal Conscience, New Brunswick, New Jersey : Rutgers University
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for European dominance — the catastrophe of World War II {Lebensraum) and the
Holocaust {Endldsung) which reached a new level of cruelty in human history. The
generals in Nazi Germany did the soldier's job, they issued the soldier's warnings, and,
when they were overruled, they did the soldier's duty. To obey under any condition was
exactly the problem of most of the Wehrmachf' officers, and this problem expressed the
enormous problem of Prussian / German military tradition versus individual responsibility
and conscience ofthe officer.
/ am a soldier; it is my duty to obey, argued Brauchitsch. Others with
equally good military logic disagreed : The highest commanders in time of
war, commented Speidel, have not always been able to differentiate
between the obedience due to God and conscience and the obedience due
to men
1. Civilianism Triumphant, 1933-1945
The consolidation of power by the Nazis depended upon an informal understanding
with the military. The military would withdraw from politics, leave this field to the Nazis,
and in return the Nazis would push an expanded rearmament program and guarantee the
army the monopoly ofthe military function and autonomy within its own sphere.
This arrangement received explicit sanction in the spring of 1934 when the
army agreed to support Hitler for President; Hitler acquiesced in the
suppression of Ernst Rohm and the S.A., who had dreams of replacing the
Reichswehr with a mass, ideologically oriented, people's army.97
In contrast, the German military ideals of obedience, loyality, honor, intellectual
integrity, realism, reason could hardly be further removed from the complete
unscrupulousness, amorality, and irrationalism of the Nazis. Hitler had little use for the
accursed objectivity of the General Staff which he described asjust a club of intellectuals.
95 Wehrmacht was the name of the German Armed Forces of the Third Reich.
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In contrast, a brilliant restatement of the military ethic was made by General Ludwig Beck,
Chief of the General Staff, in a speech at the reopening of the War Academy in October
1935.
Beck's theme was Moltke's dictum that Genius is work and he vigorously
attacked sudden inspirations and wishful thinking. The speech did not
make him any friends among the Nazis. 98
The conflict between the military approach and the Nazi approach was most
sharply focused in foreign policy. The Generals wanted to rebuild Germany's armed
might, but they wanted to do so slowly, and not in order to wage war but to protect
German security. If Germany started war, they argued, she would eventually be
confronted by a coalition of powers which would utterly destroy her. In contrast, the
Nazis wished to rush mobilization, ignore or brush aside obstacles, and embark upon an
adventuristic and aggressive foreign policy. "Step by step during the thirties the military
opposed Hitler's aggressive action, and step by step they saw their warnings rejected and
Hitler successful."99 Finally, in the summer of 1938 Hitler forced Beck to resign and
replaced him with Franz Haider. What was the consequence of this ? First of all Hitler
changed the highest officer of the Wehrmacht to demonstrate his power and to break
resistance of the General Staff against war.
2. Military Resistance and the 20 July 1944
As Hitler's campaign against Czechoslovakia mounted, a military group with
Haider's cooperation planned a coup d'etat to seize control of the government before
Germany became involved in a disastrous war. The officers, however, were torn with
indecision and hesitancy which was only finally resolved by the Allied concession at
Munich in 1938. The coup d'etat was cancelled. Hitler had again defeated his generals.
This broke the military.
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The final technique of the Nazis in altering the complexion of the officer corps was
simply the removal of those who adhered to the professional outlook and value.The first
major purge was the Werner von Blomberg - Werner von Fritsch Crisis of February 1938.
Furthermore, immediately after Munich three more generals, Beck, Wilhelm Adam, and
Gerd von Runstedt were retired. In the fall of 1941, after the Germans had been halted in
Russia, Walther von Brauchitsch, Runstedt, Bock, and Wilhelm von Leeb left active
service.
Later on General Beck was one of the leaders of the uprising against Hitler and his
Nazi regime on 20 July 1944. 100 Beck was one of the Generals who committed suicide on
the evening of this unsuccessful revolt. "From all time he exemplarily represents the
responsible and intellectual General Staff officer who followed his conscience and sacrified
his life in the revolt against the criminal dictator Hitler when he had recognised that only
the dictator's death would save Germany from total destruction." 101
Many officers participated in the attempted assassination against Hitler on 20 July
1944. They took the bitter consequences which included penal liability of their whole
families or executions by shooting or hanging, which were inflicted on them by the
sentences of the People's Court (Volksgerichtshof).
... after the July 20th, 1944 attempt to overthrow the regime, in a mass
purge of the high command, twenty generals and one admiral were
executed, five other generals commited suicide, and approximately seven
hundred officers were either executed or dismissed. 102
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Unlike many other professional groups in Hitler Germany, many of the best
General Staff officers participated on 20 July 1944 in the revolt of conscience against the
dictator and followed their code of ethics which ruled out tyranny and crimes. 103
To recapitulate, this chapter focused on problems of civil-military relations and the
influence of the military in Germany from the beginning of professionalization until the
catastrophe of the Third Reich. It is important to keep in mind three main aspects from
these historical perspectives before analyzing the Federal Republic of Germany.
(1) The Weimar Republic underlines the relevance of a successful consolidation of
democracy. Democratization and the study of civil-military relations must not end with the
successful transition toward democracy because a viable democracy rather depends on a
successful consolidation. After World War I the transition toward democracy was
successful. But Weimar never was a consolidated democracy, and Weimar never solved
the problems of civil-military relations.
(2) The failure of the first German democracy opened the way to the Third Reich.
After 1933 — in comparison to the democratic forces of the Weimar Republic ~ the
Fiihrer and Reichskanzler Hitler and his Nazis were much more successful in
consolidating their totalitarian system in Germany. The result was the second German bid
for European hegemony ~ the catastrophe ofWorld War II and the Holocaust.
(3) The problem of the Wehrmacht officers ~ to obey under any condition {oath of
loyalty to Hitler) versus resistance and participation on the 20 July 1944 (revolt of
conscience) — expressed Prussian / German military tradition versus individual
responsibility and conscience of the officer.
The total defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II was the prerequisite for
democratization in West Germany. With support of the former enemies ~ especially the
United States ~ the Federal Republic of Germany became a consolidated and viable
democracy.
Millotat, p. 50.
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IV. ASPECTS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS -
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
This chapter explains German foreign and security policy, values and interests, and,
following them, the role and mission of the Bundeswehr today and in future. Furthermore,
this chapter focuses on Innere Fuhrung -- the key-element of civil-military relations in
Germany. National foreign and security policy is only one aspect in the analysis of
civil-military relations but a key aspect because the ordering of its civil-military relations is
basic to a nation's military security policy. "The objective of this policy on the institutional
level is to develop a system of civil-military relations which will maximize military security
at the least sacrifice of other social values." 104
As a result of World War II and the cold war era Germany was divided. The
Federal Republic of Germany was founded in 1949, four years after the end of Nazi
Germany and World War II. Six years later West German rearmament led to the birth of
the Bundeswehr. Until 1989/90 of overriding importance to the Federal Republic of
Germany were transition toward and consolidation of democracy, rebuilding of the nearly
totally destroyed country, protection against the communist threat, firm integration into
the community of Western market democracies, and the regaining of unity in peace and
freedom as well as of German sovereignty. These objectives have been attained with the
German unification on 3 October 1990.
Before analyzing German foreign and security policy as well as Innere Fuhrung as
the key element of civil-military relations in Germany, it is very important to remember
several special circumstances concerning the foundation of the Federal Republic of
Germany in 1949 as well as ofthe Bundeswehr in 1955.
(1) Germany's intentions of imperialism, hegemony and Lebensraum came to an
abrupt end in 1945. With the catastrophe of World War II and the Holocaust Germany
also lost its ambitions to be a greatpower in global prospectives.
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(2) In spite of German history and tradition of democratic and liberal forces and
parties as well as resistance against Hitler and the Nazi regime from inside Germany, the
prerequisites for the transition toward and consolidation of democracy after World War II
came first of all from outside by intervention. The signature of the unconditional
surrender of the German armed forces on 7 May 1945 was ~ in contrast to the end of
World War I — the sign of total defeat. Germany was occupied by the Allied armed forces
which were in command and control of every action.
In answer to a violent and ideological war that Hitler had forced on the
world, Nazi Germany's enemies were not satisfied with victory but tried to
extirpate all remnants of nazism and remake the country in their image.
The principles that were to guide this remarking of a nation were laid
down, to the extent they could still agree, by the nations unitedfor victory
at Potsdam in August 1945. These principles are usually summarized by
listing four "d" s : denazification, demilitarization, decentralization;
decartelization; to the four, however, there should be added one
overarching fifth one : democratization, a term that took on different
coloration when interpreted by the Soviets and the Western Allies; hence
the split ofthe country. 105
(3) The process of transition toward and consolidation of democracy in West
Germany was under control as well as protection of the Western Allies, United States,
Great Britain, and France. All former Nazi forces which had supported the Nazi regime
directly or indirectly were eliminated. In addition, the Basic Law declared it illegal to form
any party with national socialist ideology. Neither the old Nazi party and its special police
force Geheime Staatspolizei (GeStaPo) nor the former Wehrmacht or Waffen SS could be
a threat to transition toward and consolidation of democracy.
(4) The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1 949 was considered
a provisional constitution, awaiting the proclamation of an all-German constitution (Art.
146). The state created on the basis of this Basic Law was a state of laws with political
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parties, basic civil rights, the separation of powers and representative government
{Bundestag).
Some main differences between the Basic Law of 1949 and the constitution of the
Weimar Republic — as a result of lessons learned ~ were as follows : 106
(a) there was no provision for emergency decrees like the famous Art. 48 of the
Weimar Constitution;
(b) there was a mixture of proportional representation and single member districts,
no provision for plebiscites, indirect elections of the Federal President, whose
powers were limited to representative functions;
(c) only parties receiving more than 5% of the total popular vote were represented
in the Bundestag — the 5% clause designed to prevent party polarization;
(d) the Federal Chancellor was given a strong position through the limitation of
parliamentary control over the government ~ the constructive vote of
no-confidence was effective only if the Bundestag simultaneously presented a new
chancellor with a majority vote;
(e) a Constitutional Court, holding the power of decision over and supplying
opinions (on request) on questions of constitutional conflicts; the court also
interprets the Basic Law and rules on the unconstitutionality of parties or
associations.
(5) The rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany also was under control of
the Western Allies. The Bundeswehr came into existance one decade after the fall of the
Third Reich and six years after the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany. Right
from the beginning the Bundeswehr was an armed force in a democratic state.
Furthermore, right from the beginning the Bundeswehr was a conscript armed force as
well as an alliance armed force.
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A. GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
On 3 October 1990, Germany regained its unity. This was the day on which the
German people's desire for unity in peace and freedom was fulfilled. 107
In the second half of 1989, the leadership of the GDR, faced with a mass exodus
and increasing protest demonstrations, found itself in a hopeless situation and was unable
to withstand these developments.
108 A heated debate on a new law permitting inhabitants
of the GDR to travel abroad led to the resignation ofthe Chairman of the Council of State
and his government. On 9 November 1989, the newly formed Politburo of the SED
ordered that the border be opened; the power of the SED collapsed.
Rejected by the vast majority of its citizens, the GDR was now shown to
be what it had been all along; a state in which justice did not prevail and
freedom was unknown, capable of existing only by means of totalitarian
control and the supervision of all spheres of life. 109
On 28 November 1989, Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl presented a ten-point
programme on intra-German policy to the Bundestag which placed the process of German
unification in the context of developments throughout Europe. On 18 March 1990, the
107
(1) It was due to the courage and determination of the Germans on the other side of the Wall and
barbed wire that the power of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) and its machinery of repression
collapsed in a bloodless revolution within a matter of weaks.
(2) The inhabitants of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) knew for certain that the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) would persistently uphold, in its domestic and foreign policy, the claim to
reunification and the right of all Germans to self-determination as stated in the Basic Law.
(3) The unity of Germany has been restored in agreement with the Four Powers and with the approval
of the international community.
(4) Crucial prerequisites for the historical development of German unification were the support
Germany received from her Western allies, the policy of reform initiated by President Mikhail Gorbachev
in the former Soviet Union and the dramatic changes that took place in the states of Central Europe,
especially in Poland and Hungary.
108 On 2 October 1989, 20,000 people demonstrated in Leipzig. One weak later, this figure had risen to
70,000. In the weeks that followed, hundreds of thousands of people attended the Leipzig Monday
Demonstrations, taking to the streets to demand reforms and a democratic renewal of the GDR, and
chanting : We are the people.
109
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first free elections were held in the GDR. The parties that received most votes were those
that advocated a rapid and fundamental change in the political order to a system of
freedom and democracy.
The first freely elected government, headed by Prime Minister Lothar de
Maiziere, resolutely pursued the objective of conducting negotiations with
the Federal Government with the aim of bringing about the unity of
Germany on the basis of Article 23 of the Basic Law, swiftly and in a
responsible manner, andfor the entire GDR at the same time. no
The process ofGerman unification led to the signing of historic treaties :
(1) 1 July 1990 : German Unification Treaty; on 1 July 1990, the Monetary,
Economic and Social Union between the two German states came into force. The
Unification Treaty governed the accession of the German Democratic Republic to the
Federal Republic of Germany in accordance with the Article 23 of the Basic Law. It took
effect on the night of 2/3 October 1990, thus ending the division of Germany, which had
lasted over 45 years.
(2) 16 July 1990 : German - Soviet Union Agreement; this agreement included the
following points : (a) the united Germany would be free to choose which alliance it wished
to belong to; (b) Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Germany by the end of 1994;
(c) over the same period, the peacetime strength of the German armed forces would be
reduced to a maximum of 370,000, (d) a comprehensive treaty on German-Soviet relations
would be concluded (this treaty was signed in Bonn on 9 November 1990).
(3) 12 September 1990 : Two plus Four Treaty; the governments of the two
German states, together with the United States of America, France, Great Britain and the
Soviet Union, drew up the Final Settlement with respect to Germany. The Two plus Four
Treaty terminated the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers of Berlin and
Germany as a whole. The united Germany gained full sovereignty over its domestic and
external affairs.
1,0
Ibid, p. 12.
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On its way to unity, the reunited Germany has made major contributions to the
consolidation of peace and stability in Europe. Germany has confirmed the definitive
nature of its borders in the Two plus Four Treaties of 12 September 1990 and in the treaty
signed with Poland on 14 September 1990. Furthermore, the Federal Government has
reaffirmed that Germany will not wage a war of aggression and that it will renounce the
manufacture and possession of and control over NBC weapons. The Preamble to the Basic
Law of the Federal Republic of Germany states that the foreign and security policy
objective to Germany is to serve the peace of the world as an equal partner in a united
Europe lu
After decades of painful division, we have regained the unity of our
fatherland in peace and freedom. Here, too, a decisive factor was that the
Federal Republic of Germany unwaveringly adhered to the two mainstays
of its foreign and security policy — the political unification of Europe and
the transatlantic partnership with the United States of America and with
Canada. 112
1. German Values and Interests
The policy of the Federal Republic of Germany is committed to peace, and its
foremost task is to safeguard, promote and shape peace within Germany as well as in the
international community.
Peace prevails when freedom and justice are realized and the dignity of
man is protected. These supreme values are the universally binding core of
human rights, which every state, regardless of different religious
persuasions and cultural traditions, has to respect and protect. The
obligation to protect the dignity of man, to ensure peace, freedom and
justice is a yardstick against which the legitimacy of politics can be
measured. These values are indivisible. Serving peace also means striving
for a world in which everyone can live in freedom, peace and dignity. 113
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Ibid, p. 39.
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Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in ibid, p. vi.
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The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany has laid major cornerstones for
determining German security interests by establishing a constitutional mandate for peace,
to work towards European security, to settle conflicts by peaceful means and to join a
system of collective security. German security policy has to take account of several
constant political factors and parameters with long-term effects. First, Germany has a
geopolitically central location with the most neighbours in Europe. Second, the economic
situation of Germany as an industrialized nation depends on exports and is firmly
interwoven with the world economy. All this sets standards for the objectives, substance
and procedures of German policy and plays a part in the way in which it is perceived by
Germany's neighbors. German foreign and security policy is guided by five central
interests :"
4
(1) Preservation of the freedom, security and welfare of the citizens of
Germany and the territorial integrity of the German state;
(2) Integration with the European democracies in the European Union, for
democracy, the rule of law and prosperity in Europe means peace and
security for Germany, too;
(3) The lasting transatlantic alliance, based on a community of values and
similar interests, with the United States as a world power, for the potential
ofthe USA is indispensable for international stability;
(4) The familiarization of our neighbours in Eastern Europe with Western
structures in a spirit of reconciliation and partnership and the creation of a
new cooperative security order embracing all the states ofEurope;
(5) Worldwide respect for international law and human rights and a just
world economic order based on market principles, for the security of the
individual states is guaranteed only in a system of global security with
peace, justice and well-being for everyone.
German foreign and security policy involves the interlinking and fair reconciliation
of interests in, for and with the international community. As a democratic, free and
prosperous nation, Germany's interest is to actively participate, as a matter of principle, in
1,4
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international peacekeeping tasks on the basis of the UN Charter. On the basis of values
and interests, the lessons of history and the transformed security situation, German
security policy is geared to attaining twelve goals :"5
(1) Protection ofGermany and its citizens against danger from without and
political blackmail;
(2) Prevention, containment and termination of crises and conflicts that
could impair the integrity and stability ofGermany or its allies;
(3) Development of the security relationship with the USA, which is based
on common values and similar interests;
(4) Strengthening of NATO as a community of shared values and a
defensive alliance of Euro-Atlantic democracies and continuing adaptation
of the Alliance to current security challenges, including its opening to the
east;
(5) Partnership with equal rights between a united Europe and North
America;
(6) Intensification of European integration by expanding the European
Union with a Common Foreign and Security Policy and a European
defence identity; development of the WEU as the defence component of
the European Union and as the European pillar of the North Atlantic
Alliance;
(7) Enlargement of the European Union and Western European Union
(WEU);
(8) Strengthening of the United Nations as a global conflict-settling
authority and the OSCE as a regional arrangement;
(9) Creation of a new cooperative security order between all states
participating in the OSCE;
(10) Consolidation and expansion of a regionally and globally effective
security order of organizations that complement and strengthen one
another;
Ibid. pp. 42-43.
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(11) Continuation of an arms control process based on the goal of
foresighted conflict prevention, with a view to creating a cooperative
security order as a basis for lasting peace and stability in and for Europe;
(12) Promotion of democratization and socio-economic progress in Europe
and throughout the world.
2. Areas of Activity and Influence
Today Germany is a member of the United Nations (UN), a participant in the
Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a member of the North
Atlantic Alliance (NATO) as well as of the European Union (EU) and the Western
European Union (WEU). Germany's intention is to cooperate with its partners in linking
these institutions together and turning them into a strong security order. Each institution
has its own particular strengths; therefore, the intention is to complement each other and
to use them flexibly because they are helping to extend political stability to Central and
Eastern Europe and into the Commonwealth of Independent States. The principles of the
Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter), the standards set by the OSCE and the code
of values contained in the Basic Law are the guidelines for Germany's foreign and security
policy.
In compliance with the UN Charter, Art. 24 of the Basic Law states that to
maintain peace, the Federal Republic of Germany may become part of a mutual collective
security system. The object of such a security system must be to establish and secure a
peaceful and lasting order in Europe and between the peoples of the world.
When Germany became a member of the United Nations in 1973, it
committed itself without reservation to the rights and duties associated
with membership. Germany is involved in all the world organization's
political, economic, legal, social and humanitarian functions. The principal
aim of German foreign policy remains to help maintain peace in the
world. 116
Ibid, p. 63.
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3. The Role and Mission of the Bundeswehr
The radically changed security environment and Germany's increased international
responsibility have an impact on the role, mission, structure, and equipment of the
Bundeswehr ni Since the end of the cold war and German unification, it has been
undergoing the greatest transformation in its history.
First, the Bundeswehr had to disband the National People's Army (Nationale
Volksarmee ~ NVA), build up the Bundeswehr in Eastern Germany, reduce the armed
forces ofthe united Germany by one third and re-station a considerable part ofthem, while
at the same time orienting them to new tasks. This process was largely completed by the
end of 1994, when the total strength of the armed forces' military personnel was reduced
to the contractually agreed ceiling of 370,000.
Against the background of the continuing evolution of the security situation and
limited resources in the post-cold war era, the second challenge was to define in detail the
armed forces that Germany wishes to have and retain in terms of their capabilities and
target structures and to adapt them in such a way that they will be able to accomplish their
tasks in the future.
118 The Bundeswehr will perform two principal defense functions.
On the one hand, it must be able to cooperate with allies and partners in
order to contribute at short notice to managing the likely international
crises and conflicts; on the other hand, it must have the capability to build
up and employ defensive forces adequate to deal with what is at present an
unlikely contingency, but at the same time the worst-case scenario, namely
having to defend Germany and the Alliance. 119
The mission of the Bundeswehr is based on the obligation set forth in the Basic
Law, under which Germany must preserve the unity of the nation and the state and serve
world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe. Its reflects Germany's security-related
needs and security interests.
" 7
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The Bundeswehr :
(1) Protects Germany and its citizens against political blackmail and danger
from without;
(2) Advances military stability and European integration;
(3) Defends Germany and its allies;
(4) Serves world peace and international security in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations;
(5) Provides disaster relief, saves life and supports humanitarian
activities.
Although the security environment, role, structure, size, and mission of the
Bundeswehr have changed drastically since 1990, some fundamental conditions and values
of the Bundeswehr did not change.
First, the Bundeswehr is still an army in a democracy — the unified Federal
Republic of Germany. Second, the Bundeswehr is still an alliance armed force. It is
integrated in the force structure of an alliance made up of democratic states. Third, the
Bundeswehr will remain a conscript army ~ for historico-political, security- related, social
and military reasons
:
(1) Universal conscription is part of the defence culture that has evolved
over the decades in our country. It is an expression of the individual
citizen's willingness to take his personal share of the responsibility for
protecting his polity. The defence of freedom, justice and human dignity is
a matter that concerns everyone.
(2) Universal conscription firmly establishes the armed forces in society.
Through its conscripts, the Bundeswehr remains in close contact with
every segment of the population, particularly the young generation.
Conscription creates a high degree of social awareness and interest in
issues concerning security and armed forces among policy-makers and in
society. It enhances people's consciousness of their common responsibility
for the polity.
Ibid., p. 85.
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(3) Universal conscription ensures that the armed forces obtain all
manpower they need. Compared with Germany's partners and neighbours
in Europe, the overall strength of its armed forces corresponds to its
political and economic importance, its central location and the size of its
population.
(4) Universal conscription ensures that the Bundeswehr is operational. By
enabling the Bundeswehr to call up reservists, it ensures the armed
forces mobilization capability and substainability in action. It establishes a
firm base for recruitment and enhances professionalism in the Bundeswehr,
because it can fall back on a cross-section of young men's abilities, skills
and professional qualifications. The Bundeswehr currently recruits around
one half of its regulars and temporary-carrer volunteers from its pool of
conscripts.
(5) In the new Lander, conscription is highly instrumental in anchoring the
Bundeswehr in people's minds. It is promoting the exchange of views and
ideas between young people in East and West and helping to complete
internal unification.
(6) Conscripts take part in United Nations peace missions and
humanitarian relief activities on a voluntary basis.
(7) The concept of Innere Fiihrung and the model of the democratic
citizen in uniform are hallmarks of the German Bundeswehr, reinforced in
its values during the process ofGerman unification. 121
B. BUNDESWEHR IN STATE AND SOCIETY
The Bundeswehr is one of several tools of German foreign and security policy and
remains the visible expression of the sovereignty of Germany. Universal conscription is
and will remain the expression of the individual citizen's personal share of responsibility
for a life in peace and freedom. 122
The problem of civil-military relations in the Federal Republic of Germany in the
1950s was solved first of all by basic civilian control, e.g., basic law, institutions, a civilian
as Minister of Defense, and then ~ in addition ~ by Innere Fiihrung. Innere Fiihrung is a
result of the specific German history and lessons learned.
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1.
Innere Fiihrung
The key element of German rearmament and civil-military relations is the concept
of Innere Fiihrung. "The concept of Innere Fiihrung harmonizes the principles of freedom
held by a democratic constitutional state and the principle of order and function that armed
forces must observe to accomplish the mission assigned to them under the constitution." 123
The principles and fundamentals of Innere Fiihrung combine the demands of the
military mission and duty with the dignity and rights of the citizen. They are designed to
balance the tensions that arise from the military obligations of a member of the armed
forces and the rights and liberties of a citizen. Innere Fiihrung is an integral part of every
leadership activity in all domains and at all levels. It constitutes the fundamental principle
of leadership and conduct, and as such pervades every aspect of routine. Innere Fiihrung
leaves its mark on both the spirit and attitude prevalent in the Bundeswehr. This concept is
a unique and very complex one; therefore, it also suffers misinterpretations,
misunderstandings and non-acceptance. Often serious critiques come from civilians and
soldiers who either do not know the concept and its complexity or do not accept the fact
that the unique German history — World War I, World War II, and Holocaust ~ really
legitimates a unique concept of civil-military relations including a special type of soldier as
a citizen in uniform. For example, Huntington's analysis of German history is very good,
but when he analyses the first ideas of Innere Fiihrung in 1956/57 ~ the keystone of
civil-military relations in the Federal Republic ofGermany until today ~ he fails.
The aristocratic army of Frederick the Great was destroyed by Napoleon.
The professional army created by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau was
destroyed by Hitler. Now the proposal was to create a democratic army, an
ideologically motivated force embodying subjective rather than objective
civilian control. In part, this approach was a reaction against the
professionalism of the past and the product of the false identification of
that professionalism with Hitler. Ironically, it was also in part an imitation
of the American conquerors of Hitler. But the changes of the Bonn
government were not for the better. They were a retrogression to a more
primitive form of civil-military relations. Inevitably they will foster the
permanent embroilment of the German military in politics and reduce the
Federal Ministry of Defense, p. 132.
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fighting effectiveness of the new army. Despite what Heir Blank had to
say, a democratic state is better defended by a professional force than by a
democratic force. The Federal German Republic possessess the confidence
of its citizens and strong central institutions such as the Weimar Republic
never had. The obstacles to civilian control which existed in the twenties
no longer exist. It would be tragic if the new German democracy did not
seize the opportunity to reestablish an effective system of civilian control
and a professional officer corps. It could do far worse than to resurrect the
tradition of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Clausewitz. 124
This long quotation is necessary to underline how important Huntington's
misunderstanding and / or misinterpretation is. Perhaps Huntington has not had enough
information about Innere Fuhrung which was developed in the 1950s and early 1960s.
But Huntington's misinterpretation includes the main arguments of criticism and / or
non-acceptance of Innere Fuhrung until today. And this is serious because Innere
Fuhrung — in theory as well as in practice ~ became exactly the opposite of Huntington's
interpretation.
First, Innere Fuhrung is not a more primitive form of civil-military relations which
"will foster the permanent embroilment of the German military in politics and reduce the
fighting effectiveness of the new army." Rather, it is a more qualitative — in Huntington's
theory not existing ~ form of civil-military relations as a result of the special guilt and
responsibility in history. Probably the world has seen enough German military effectiveness
especially in World War I and in World War II.
Second, Huntington's argument that "a democratic state is better defended by a
professional force than by a democratic force" is simplistic. The Bundeswehr is very
proud to be a democratic and professional army on the basis of the Innere Fuhrung
including civilian control / civilian supremacy and civil-military cooperation (Primat der
Politik), integration into state and society (Staatsbiirger in Uniform), a high responsibility
toward democracy (Politische Bildung - Protector ofDemocracy), and high military skills
(A uftragstaktik).
Huntington, The Soldier and the State , pp. 123-124.
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Here in the United States, among the members of our military, the
Bundeswehr has long been regarded as a military force of superb quality,
expertly trained and prepared for battle; truly an ally whom we would be
both proud and fortunate to have on our flank in battle. The same is true
today.
125
Innere Fuhrung is practised by way of training, leadership, care and welfare,
political education, military law and military discipline. In this way, German soldiers learn
about the political and legal reasons for military service and are made to appreciate the
purpose of the military mission. Innere Fuhrung promotes the integration of the
Bundeswehr and its military personnel into state and society and helps foster appreciation
of the Bundeswehr s role in the Alliance and collective security system. When the
principles of Innere Fuhrung are observed, education and training make the soldiers more
willing to perform their duties conscientiously, to assume responsibility and to cooperate
with others; they also promote discipline and cohesion among the troops. Innere Fuhrung
takes the code of values and legal system as the basis for internal discipline and increases
efficiency and professionalism in the Bundeswehr. 126
In accordance with the concept ofInnere Fuhrung, the German soldier is a citizen
in uniform. This model is a guide and yardstick for leadership, education and training in
the Bundeswehr. The model of the citizen in uniform stands for the citizen who is prepared
to defend his country as a willing member of its armed forces and who assumes
responsibility for the freedom and human dignity of others. He is a politically educated and
responsible citizen who recognizes and is a firm advocate of the political causes,
conditions and consequences of the military action he takes.
Innere Fuhrung has made the Bundeswehr an integral and natural component of
the democratic state order and society. It is at least in the German case an outstanding
concept for the comprehensive integration of armed forces into a democratic state.
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2. Development of Innere Fiihrung
The need for a concept of Innere Fiihrung became evident when, following the
demilitarization of West German society after World War II, the leadership of the Federal
Republic of Germany came under pressure to provide armed forces for the common
defense ofWestern Europe.
The Berlin blockade in 1948 started the cold war. As a consequence of this
development, the United States began to consider with seriousness the need for West
German rearmament. Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer recognized the need for a
common Western defence and understood as well that own armed forces were part of a
nation's claim to sovereignty. Furthermore, Konrad Adenauer and his advisors had
recognized that German forces, whether part of a European force or independent, would
need to be accepted by the German public as well as by the Western Allies. 127
In the Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945 the Allies had decided that "... the
German educational system must be supervised so that Nazi and militaristic precepts are
eliminated completely... " 12S In the post-war period the aims of the occupation forces
matched the natural inclination of the German population so well that in 1954 Paul Sethe
could write in the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung :
The military tradition of the Germans was broken off in 1945. In the nine
years since, memories and sentiments have become overwhelming among
young people that make it difficult to link up with this heritage. Two lost
wars with their terrible casualties; great parts of our cities will remain in
rubble for long to come; the appeal to idealism and a sense of sacrifice
have been brutally abused and arouse today only bitterness among many;
the long struggle of the occupiers against German soldierly pride has not
been without effect; the division ofGermany paralyzes many. 129
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The challenges that faced the founders of the Bundeswehr were to overcome this
distrust of all things military, which was a legacy of the military's misuse by the Nazis, and
to provide a raison d'etre for military forces in a democracy that would confer legitimacy
on them in a modern pluralistic society. At the same time, they recognized that new
concepts of professionalism and leadership were needed within the armed forces in order
to protect the state and the individual soldier from the excesses of a reactionary military
elite. "In short, they were faced with the problem of the proper ordering of the military
within their democratic society." 130 In other Western democracies the development of
these relations, the growth of a military tradition supporting democratic social values, and
the evolution of an officer corps that embodies ideals necessary to sustain these values in a
military environment have generally taken place over an extended and unbroken national
history. Even when controversy arises, it does so within the context of a general
understanding ofthe utility ofthe armed forces and their proper place in society.
In the 1950s domestic discussion the founders of the Bundeswehr faced the
problems of defining these relations without benefit of history; of
discovering a tradition that would encourage their proper development;
and of providing leaders, most of whom would come at first from a
military with anti-democratic roots, with the tools and the will to support
the social values necessary for the proper functioning of a military within a
democracy. They would have to do all of this in the glare of publicity and
through dialogue with a public which, for the most part, had no desire to
face the questions it was being asked. 131
A number of people, who included former Wehrmacht officers, academics, and
politicians, worked on the conceptualization of the ideas of Innere Fiihrung during the
1950s and early 1960s. At the same time Innere Fiihrung became most closely associated
in the public's mind with Wolf Count von Baudissin. Baudissin, who was a former
Wehrmacht officer, provided some earlier input for Innere Fiihrung 132
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While the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany had to be amended to
address the requirements of the armed forces, and separate legislation was enacted to
clarify the legal position of the soldier, the basis for the Innere Fuhrung was stated in the
first article of the Basic Law as it was written in 1949 :
The dignity ofman shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the
duty of all state authority. 133
This personal dignity is not lost when one becomes a soldier. The soldier retains
the rights of a citizen, narrowed only as necessary to carry out his military duties. 134 The
soldier is a citizen in uniform (Staatsburger in Uniform). In the oath sworn by regular and
temporary-career volunteers and in the solemn pledge made by conscripts, Bundeswehr
personnel promise to loyally serve the Federal Republic of Germany and bravely defend
the rights and freedom ofthe German people. 135
The oath and solemn pledge place members of the armed forces under a moral
obligation to defend the code of values set forth in the Basic Law. International law and
human rights are major components of this code. It forms the basis for the simple laws,
including the Legal Status of Military Personnel Act, on which a serviceman's obligation
to be obedient is legally founded and limited by law.
The German soldier must acknowledge and accept the principles of democracy as
expressed in the Basic Law and dedicate himself to their preservation. 136 These principles
include civilian control and civilian supremacy of the military {Primat der Politik). In the
German parliamentary democracy, military personnel can rest assured that the decisions
taken by the executive are lawful and are open to public scrutiny and judicial review.
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Any order they receive from their superiors must be within the law. The
serviceman can therefore be certain that he will only be employed after
thorough and conscientious consideration has been given to a situation and
only if there is a sound legal basis for such action. ... Combat will remain
the ultima ratio 137
Furthermore, the soldier is not to follow orders which assault human dignity or
would otherwise be illegal. 138 Theodor Blank, first Minister of Defense of the Federal
Republic of Germany, expressed it as follows : "Democracy can be defended only by
democrats, andfreedom only by those who experience it themselves" 13,9
Baudissin wished to embed the soldier firmly in the democratic society and to leave
as little as possible in the purely military sphere. Military tradition was a thorny matter,
because although civil-military relations in Germany between 1871 and 1914 reflected an
extraordinary degree of objective civilian control and military professionalism founded
upon a high level and restricted scope of military authority, the German armed forces'
political manipulations during and after World War I and their culpability in the Nazi
regime and World War II hardly furnished material for the tradition of armed forces in a
democratic society.
Traditions worthy of study and emulation were eventually found. These
included the heroes of the Wars of Liberation against Napoleon and the
General Staff officers who conspired to assassinate Hitler on 20 July
1944. 140
However, these latter were not uncontroversial, and the whole question of what
constitutes a valid tradition for the Bundeswehr concerning the former Reichswehr as well
as former Wehrmacht still remains open today, over fifty years after the end of World War
II. In contrast, only three years after German unity there was no doubt about it that the
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former National People's Army of the GDR — because it was the army of the party and the
class in a communist system — cannot constitute a valid tradition for the Bundeswehr. 141
There is obviously still a German problem : to overcome the country's own history
until 1945. This problem we must keep in mind when addressing the legacy of the National
Pepole's Army (Nationale Volksarmee - NVA). The problem to overcome German history
is neither a special problem of the Bundeswehr nor a weak point ofInnere Fiihrung — it is
a problem of the German society in general.
3. Challenges for Innere Fiihrung
On 3 October 1990 the Bundeswehr took control of the personnel, equipment, and
installations of what had been the NVA. The act of taking over the NVA was massive
because of the sheer amount of equipment, ammunition, and acreage for which the
Bundeswehr found itself responsible in the new federal states, and it was historic because
soldiers who had faced each other across a deep ideological divide for over thirty years
would now be serving together. 142
Securing, inventoring, and disposing of the materiel of the former NVA was to be
the major mission of the Bundeswehr throughout its first years in the new states. This
mission has been complicated by three factors :
(1) the almost immediate need to support the liberation ofKuwait through materiel
shipments and support of departing U.S. soldiers;
(2) the additional responsibility to assist the Western group of Soviet Forces in an
orderly withdrawal from German territory;
141 Bundesminister der Verteidigung - Fu S I 4 (editor), ZDv 10/1 - Innere Fiihrung, Bonn (GE), 1993,
preface no. 3.
142 Schbnbohm, JGrg. Two Armies And One Fatherland. The End of the Nationale Volksarmee ,
Providence and Oxford : Berghahn Books, 1996, preface, pp. 36-37. "The size of the NVA ~ while it was
under the GDR government ~ had been reduced by mid-September from 175,000 to about 103,000; the
military intelligence service, the military prosecutors and the propaganda units had been disbanded. Thus
on 2 October we had new information about the number of personnel and the amount of equipment
available. According to that information we estimated the personnel strength about 103,000, including
32,000 officers and 20,000 NCO's. We assessed the equipment strength as consisting of 2,300 battle
tanks, 7.800 armoured fighting vehicles, 2.500 artillery pieces, 400 fighter aircraft, 71 warships, 50 attack
helicopters. 1.2 million small arms and 300,000 tons of ammunition."
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(3) the long-term requirement to reduce the Bundeswehr s size by almost 30
percent.
"The unification of Germany came quickly and surprisingly ~ hoped for and
desired by many, opposed and obstructed by others." 143 Of more lasting significance,
however, was the human impact of the unification. Lieutenant General Jdrg Schonbohm's
estimate of this aspect was as follows :
As no one knew how many career and short-service men would really still
be in the NVA after 3 October, the decisive question for us was : how
could we take control of these enormous quantities of equipment and
guarantee that it was securely guarded. What is more, it was not clear how
far the officers, who had been indoctrinated by the Communists and trained
to hate us, were really ready to serve, at least a transitional period. Would
a sense of responsibility be stronger than the Socialist military training ? I
was optimistic.
144
In the midst of the changes wrought by unification, the Bundeswehr took on
missions for which its origin and history had uniquely qualified it. First, there was the
self-imposed requirement to select former NVA officers and noncommissioned officers
who requested active duty in the Bundeswehr and then train them to assume the functions
of leaders in the armed forces of a democratic society. Second, the Bundeswehr would
have to build legitimacy for the armed forces among an East German population that had
learned to distrust the military.
Innere Fiihrung which had stood the Bundeswehr in good stead in similar
endeavors at its beginning and throughout its short history, was used again to meet these
new challenges. There is no doubt about it that the principles of Innere Fiihrung played a
key-role in the early development of the Bundeswehr as an army in a democracy and in its
acceptance by the civilian populace of the Federal Republic of Germany, and these
principles have promoted the same processes in the new German states. Although the
NVA was not the army the Bundeswehr thought it was facing during the years of the Cold
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War era, its true legacy is being surmounted by leaders well-versed in Innere Fiihrung.
Grave problems remain, however. A sensitive application of Innere Fiihrung can help
solve some of these problems, and some of them mirror issues from the Bundeswehr's
own history, while others, such as the economic conditions in the new states that adversely
affect soldiers and civilians alike, are not amenable to correction by the military alone. 145
In discussing the role of Innere Fiihrung in the Bundeswehr s mission in the new
states since 3 October 1990, one must keep in mind that Innere Fiihrung addressed a
number of audiences. First, it had to address those in uniform on 3 October 1990,
especially those in leadership roles. Second, it had to deal with the attitudes and needs of
the young men in the new states who would be conscripted or recruited into the
Bundeswehr and those who would become its officers and noncommissioned officers.
Third, it had to come to terms with the civilian population. 146
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By 3 October 1990 the generals and admirals had already been dismissed from the NVA as had been
the political officers. NVA officers were being given the opportunity and being encouraged to leave the
service with a small severance payment or, if over fifty years of age. with a pension, in order to reduce the
number who would have to be involuntarily cut at a later date. About 60 percent of the 32,000 officers on
hand on 3 October 1990 elected this option.
By the early spring of 1991, about 6,000 of the approximately 11,000 former NVA officers who had
requested to serve a two-year probation period in the Bundeswehr were informed that their applications
had been accepted. Those who were not accepted left the service in the following months.
Those accepted had already experienced a reduction in rank - often as many as two pay grades — in
order to bring them into step with the Bundeswehr's promotion system which was a great deal slower
than the NVA's had been. These officers could now request consideration for professional status in order
to remain in the service indefinitely. For these officers, much would depend on the single officer efficiency
report they would receive from their commanders the following April, as well as on the findings of the
independent Gauck commission, which was searching for evidence of Stasi collaboration.
Officers in leadership positions and noncommissioned officers, the majority of whose requests for
two-year service status had been accepted because of the shortage of noncommissioned officers in the new
states, underwend suplemental training, which consisted of courses at an officers or noncommissioned
officers school to bring them up to the level of leadership ability corresponding with their ranks, courses
at a branch school to become proficient with the duties required by their positions, and practical
experience with their sister units in the old states before returning for duty with their own commands. For
field grade staff officers, however, this training consisted of a two-week course on Innere Fiihrung and
on-the-job training.
For the officers of the old NVA 1992 was a difficult year. The two-year probation period would come
to an end, and for those who wished to stay, the officer efficiency report they would receive from their
commanders, any academic reports they received from Bundeswehr schools attended, and finally the
decision of an independent, citizens' screening board would be key to their future careers. In total,
approximately 3,000 officers, usually younger, lower-ranking officers, were selected for career or
long-term service (six to twelve years).
66
Innere Fiihrung was realized in two ways. First, through formal training at the
Center for Innere Fiihrung, in the troop or branch schools, and in the field. Second,
through the personal example (Fuhren durch Vorbild) provided by soldiers of the old
Bundeswehr, who had lived with the principles of Innere Fiihrung throughout their
professional lives, who honestly believed in them and their effectiveness in providing a
compass for the military in a democratic society and had internalized them to such a
degree that these principles informed their actions and attitudes.
In the new states, political training in the units consisted largely of instruction on
how to get along and survive in the chaos of democracy and capitalism. Even after
attending leadership training and courses, officers and noncommissioned officers had
difficulty understanding the principles of Innere Fiihrung and explaining them to others.
Sometimes the participants only half-heartedly adopted the principles and aims of Innere
Fiihrung and their acceptance was based on the pragmatic formula : "If it helps me, it's
all-right"™
In any event, young soldiers from old and new states did not like to serve under
officers and noncommissioned officers of the old NVA. Even if some soldiers were having
trouble grasping the formal lessons on Innere Fiihrung, and even before things settled
down enough in the units to conduct political training, these soldiers were witnessing the
principles ofInnere Fiihrung being lived by the soldiers who came from the old states.
Perhaps this is the main factor why Innere Fiihrung despite all problems became
very successful. The principles ofInnere Fiihrung first of all must be lived by the superiors
rather than trained in special courses {Vorbildfunktiori). From the very beginning, visibly at
least, there was to be no difference between soldiers of the old NVA and the old
Bundeswehr — there were to be no second-class soldiers.
The following four examples underline this very important aspect
:
m
(1) The very decision to send so few soldiers from the West was based on a desire
not to insult the dignity and feelings of the officers and men of the old NVA any more than
was necessary, and this desire was rooted in the principle ofInnere Fiihrung.
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(2) The same was true of the decision of the Commander, Bundeswehr Command,
East, concerning the uniform. There were enough fatigue uniforms to clothe everyone in
his command, but not enough dress uniforms. Lieutenant General Schonbohm, with
permission granted by the Minister of Defense, ordered that all soldiers in the Bundeswehr
East wear fatigues, to include himself and his staff officers.
(3) The career cadres of the former NVA were largely officers, and the proportion
of officers were at least three times as high as in the Bundeswehr. 149 Professional training
was intensive and led to many academic qualifications; specialisations which had been
obtained were further developed in the management of personnel. In this lay a certain
strength for the leadership apparatus; the price, however, was that NVA officers were
narrowly restricted to their own sphere of work and knew little of other areas. NVA
officers ~ with the exception of the highest levels — were intentionally prevented from
making independent decisions.
The former NVA required highly specialised experts who had no overview of the
whole system. Room for manoeuvre was restricted by numerous regulations. 150
The Bundeswehr practise of ordering a soldier to carry out a mission but
letting the individual decide on the method ~ Fiihrung durch Auftrag ~
did not exist in the NVA ... Training in the Bundeswehr is in complete
contrast. We train the carreer and short-service soldiers to be able to carry
out orders in an independent manner. This means that when an order is
given only the goal, but not the method of achieving it, is specified, and
this gives the responsible person on the spot greater freedom of
manoeuvre. This procedure requires appropriate training and the ability to
take one's own decisions. Because of this, considerable demands are made
149 Schonbohm, preface, pp. 34-35.
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servicemen. In addition, the NVA undertook many duties which in the Federal Republic of Germany are
the responsibility of civilian officials or private bodies, ranging from telecommunications installations and
the subsidising of sport in armed forces' sport clubs, to running school and kindergarten canteens.
Furthermore, in small garrison towns in particular, the NVA carried out many public functions and
consequently had a dominant role. From 1985 the economic situation of the GDR grew dramatically
worse. From this time onwards up to 55,000 NVA personnel had to work in the general economy, while
the armed forces continued to be kept at an eighty-five per cent state of readiness. On 3 October 1990, the
day on which the NVA was taken over, it was no longer the highly trained militarily and ideologically
reliable army of previous years. The extreme example of this was a mutiny of conscripts in January 1990
at the Beelitz base, south-west of Berlin.
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of the individual, in order to achieve suitable training and education of
junior officers and NCOs. 15 '
(4) Former NVA soldiers were repeatedly surprised by the openness and frankness
of the Bundeswehr soldiers. For an army who had conducted its business behind closed
doors and with highly formalized and rigid speech patterns, and whose officers were
inaccessible to the enlisted men, the informality and accessibility of officers like the
commander of Bundeswehr himself, Lieutenant General Schonbohm, came as a pleasant
surprise. This openness was a key asset for Bundeswehr soldiers in dealing with their
counterparts from the East. 152
But there seems to be still a problem :
... the Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr wrote that as the NVA had been,
until 9 November 1989, an Army of the Party and instrument of a
dictatorship, it would cease to exist and ... Symbols, uniforms, and
traditions of the NVA will not be transferred to the Bundeswehr. The
problem, as the Bundeswehr found in relation to the Reichswehr and
Wehrmacht, is that traditions do not die that easily ... . 153
There is no doubt about it that coming to grips with the principles of Innere
Fuhrung also forced those who remained to confront their past and their role in
supporting the SED regime. In doing this, they did not always receive the support they
should have expected from the soldiers of the old Bundeswehr. But the overall extent of
the Westerners' openness and willingness to work together usually became evident to the
more perceptive officers of the old NVA when they considered what they would have
done had history taken a different turn and the NVA had taken over the Bundeswehr 1M
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To recapitulate, this chapter focused on German democratization after World War
II, German foreign and security policy including German unification, and Innere Fuhrung
as the key element of civil-military relations in the Federal Republic of Germany. It is
important to keep in mind five main aspects from the analysis of the Federal Republic of
Germany and Innere Fuhrung .
(1) The concept of Innere Fuhrung is a key element of civil-military relations in
Germany. Despite all criticism this concept was and still is very successful at least in the
German case.
(2) Innere Fuhrung reflects a permanent process with interdependent relations
between state, society, and Bundeswehr. It includes the three aspects which should
characterize a modern concept of civil-military relations :
- civilian control / civilian supremacy over the military in general;
- civil-military cooperation concerning national security issues;
- integration of the armed forces and soldiers into state and society.
(3) The German Bundeswehr is very proud to be a democratic and professional
army on the basis of the Innere Fuhrung including civilian control / civilian supremacy as
well as civil-military cooperation {Primal der Politik), integration into state and society as
a citizen in uniform (Staatsbiirger in Uniform), a high responsibility toward democracy
(Politische Bildung - Protector ofDemocracy), and high military skills (Auftragstaktik).
(4) Innere Fuhrung has become a model for new democracies especially in Eastern
Europe, when they consider how to rebuild their armed forces and to solve the problems
of civil-military relations in the ongoing process of transition towards and consolidation of
democracy:
(5) But these countries including Russia should keep in mind the special
circumstances of German democratization after World War II before using the German
Bundeswehr and Innere Fuhrung as a positive example.
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V. ASPECTS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS -
RUSSIAN HISTORY
Because of the complexity of the Russian / Soviet history this chapter analyses only
some selected issues of civil-military relations and its problems and focuses on military
reforms, professionalism and civil-military conflict in Imperial Russia from 1863-1917 as
well as on the party-state system after 1917, the military in the party-state and
civil-military conflict in the Soviet Union until 1991.
A. IMPERIAL RUSSIA
William C. Fuller argues that in Imperial Russia, as elsewhere, professional soldiers
represented a distinct subgroup of professional men. 155 Because of the difficulties which
confuse objective evaluations of military competence in the theoretical debate, 156 Fuller
prefers a definition of military professionalism in which competence is deemphasized while
consciousness is stressed. He defines military professionalism by five criteria : 157
(1) special knowledge and skill in schools of military learning or by experience in
the field;
(2) standards of performance within the officer corps;
(3) group identity;
(4) recognition and articulation of the special interests of the military;
(5) autonomy ~ if the army cannot itself control admissions to the officer corps or
promotion within it, it nontheless demands that considerations ofmilitary expertise
weight heavily in these decisions.
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Following this definition, professionalism is — like Huntington's definition ~ not
the equivalent of excellence or even competence. The Tightness or wrongness of the tsarist
army's military doctrine is likewise an invalid measure of its professionalism. 158
1. The Miliutin Reforms, 1863-1880
General D.A. Miliutin, War Minister from 1863 to 1880, implemented a series of
liberal, imaginative, and integrally related reforms which had as their goal the infusion of
efiicency and competence into every aspect of Russian military life. Furthermore, under his
leadership the army was rearmed twice.
The Miliutin period from 1863 to 1880 was a time of promise for the Russian
army, and the Russian army had taken its first step towards professionalism. Miliutin s
three key aspects of reform were organization, education, and universal conscription. The
law of universal conscription of 1874 was the quintessential illustration of Miliutin s
reformism : while using the resources of the Empire to modernize the army, he also wished
to use the resources ofthe army to modernize the empire.
The key elements of Miliutin s reforms were : 159
(1) Organization : Miliutin s most lasting reform was the creation of military
districts incorporating all of the provinces of the empire. Before Miliutin, the Russian
army, in terms of its organizational redundancies and structural defects, had been one of
the most backward institutions in the Imperial state. Under Miliutin's brilliant tutelage, the
army and the War Ministry at one bound matched the most sophisticated of the empire's
governmental agencies.
158 For example, Gen. M.I. Dragomirov argued as the head of the Nicholas Academy of the General Staff
from 1878 to 1889 and thereafter in countless articles and pamphlets that the decisive factor in warfare
was morale, not technology. Furthermore, in strategy the dominant Gen. G.A. Leer overstressed that
strategy — in contrast to modern strategy like the use of railroads for movement — was a fine art and all
known strategic principles could be learned from an analysis of the campaigns of Republican Rome.
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(2) Education : To Miliutin, professionalism began with education. His goal had
been to create a broadly educated, socially responsible officer corps, and to some extent he
was successful. For example, the old cadet corps, that combination of primary and
secondary school for future officers which had emphasized brutal discipline and automatic
obedience, gave way to the military gymnasium staffed with civilian instructors.
Furthermore, Miliutin regularized the old junker schools, and opened them and some of
the military schools to the previously bound classes ~ including the peasantry. Concern for
improving standards among the rank-and-file officers was paralleled by a concern for
transforming the officers of the General Staff into a true military elite. The vehicle of that
transformation, once again, was education ~ in this case substantive changes in the
curriculum and status of the Nicholas Academy of the General Staff. Miliutin s plan was to
make the Staff Academy the school for the most intellectually able officers in the army,
officers who were to be selected, if possible, without regard to social class or wealth.
What Miliutin had done for the General Staff he replicated on a smaller scale for three
other intellectually prestigious groups of officers : the lawyers ~ Alexander Academy of
Military Justice; the engineers ~ Nicholas Engineering Academy; the artillerists — Michael
Artillery Academy.
(3) Universal Conscription Law : Miliutin s greatest achievement of all was
doubtless the enactment of the universal conscription law of 4 January 1874. This
conscription law was both an act of military reform and an act of social reform, since
Miliutin hoped with its aid to drive the peasantry into school.
2. Military Professionalism, 1881-1914
The Miliutin period from 1863 to 1880 was a time of promise for the Russian
army, and the Russian army had taken its first step towards professionalism. But after
Miliutin was replaced by Alexander III the situation changed. The Miliutin reforms were
revised in toto. The time from 1881 to World War I was characterized by low quality as
well as low quantity of the personnel ~ especially the officers and officer candidates.
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In the Russian case, however, there were three distinctive reasons why the officer's
career lost its attractiveness :
160
(1) the antiprogressive spirit of the military counterreforms;
(2) the low pay of Russian officers;
(3) the redeployment of 45 percent of the army in miserable little hamlets in the
western military districts to counterbalance Germany's alarming superiority in
mobilization speed.
With regard to a sense of group identity, the third point of Fuller's definition of
military professionalism, the notorious disunity of the Russian officer corps, militated
against a highly articulated corporate spirit. Unlike English and Prussian officers, Russian
officers were not cut from the same mold. In contrast, the Russian army contained a
hierarchy of subservices. There was no corporate spirit of the officer corps but rather a
cast espirit : Imperial Suite ~ the most exclusive organization ~ 150 officers attached
directly to the Emperor; Imperial Guards; Cossacks; Cavalry; Infantry. There were vast
differences in the status, career prospects, and privileges of the various subservices of the
tsarist army. The Imperial government was alive to the disunity of tsarist officers and
developed two strategies for overcoming it : 161
(1) the Officers' Clubs : this strategy failed because the new officers' clubs were
organized by service and unit ~ and hence did nothing to bridge the gaps of
disunity.
(2) the Code of Honor : this strategy failed also and became the reason for an
negative corporate spirit ~ duty to defend the officers' honor, duels, growing
confrontation of military and society.
In summary, the Russian officers ~ in contrast to the German officer corps —
lacked the cohesion to pursue a program of corporate interests or even to develop such a
program. The disunity of the Russian officers, then, contributed to their failure to satisfy
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the fourth condition of professionalism : the recognition and articulation of innate military
interests.
Fuller comes to the conclusion that the Russian tsarist officer corps at the
beginning of World War I in 1914 was not very professional or military professionalism
simply did not exist. All great nations had problems to realize the process towards
professional armed forces ~ no doubt about it — but if we rank the great European armies
in terms of their professionalism, then, the German army would head the list, while the
Russian would come near the bottom.
3. Civil-Military Conflict
In late Imperial Russia civil-military conflict was a reality and a result of the
attempt of the Russian Army to develop a professional Russian officer corps. The
autocracy was unready to grant the army more autonomy, since military autonomy was
itself a contradiction of the autocratic principle. Civil-military conflict was the unavoidable
result, and this conflict was dysfunctional because it damaged the combat readiness of the
army.
The Russian army did contain a leaven of self-conscious military professionalism.
But the War Ministry itself became imbued with the new professional spirit from 1880 to
1905 because in this period the graduates of Miliutin's reformed academies came to
dominate key institutions within the Ministry. The estimate of the situation in the Russian
War Ministry was determined by two great challenges in this time. First, the power of the
German Reich in the West. Second, Russia's own military weakness because of
technological backwardness.
The War Ministry's devotion to its own vested interests deepened in response to
its conflict with the other governmental ministries. And the number of such conflicts
increased in the late 19th century as the political power ofthe War Ministry declined. 162
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Fuller analyses as one of the factors instrumental to the decline of the War Ministry
the attitudes and values of Russia's last two autocrats : Alexander III and Nicholas II. 163
There were two styles of civil-military confrontation in the late Imperial Russia ~ negative
corporatist and professionalism. The first is best typified by clashes between officers and
civilians over questions of honor, or perceived antimilitary bias. The second is best
illustrated by conflicts between military officials and civilian bureaucrats or courtiers over
the interests and purpose of the army. To a great extent negative corporativism was the
antithesis of pure military professionalism. But ideal military professionalism did not exist
in Russia at this time. Professionalism and negative corporatism could and did coexist in
the mind of Russian officers. The majority of officers were unprofessional in terms of
Fuller's definition as late as 1910. Both professionalism and negative corporatism became
more intense in the tsarist officer corps from 1881 to 1914. Both stimulated civil-military
conflict, which also grew more serious during this period.
Arising in the early years of the reign of Alexander III, civil-military conflict grew
in intensity throughout the nineties, was exacerbated by the multiple traumas of 1904 to
1907, and attained vast proportions during the constitutional period. The tsarist regime,
which had so often underwritten the interests of the army in the past, largely reduced its
support for these interests from 1881 to 1914. 164
163
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propagate its ideas and interests.
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At the prodding of the Ministry of Finance, the Imperial government pursued a
course of economic and industrial modernization in the nineties. In the opinion of the
army's leadership, this led to budgetary allocations which gravely underfunded the
military. Towards the end of the nineties, confronted by burgeoning challenges to its
authority from the intelligentsia, the peasantry, and the working masses, the autocracy
responded by employing the army to check and crush internal unrest on an ever increasing
scale. The revolution of 1905 started a period of hysteria and bloodshed that provided the
greatest challenge the Russian Empire had known until World War I, the army did in fact
save the Imperial government from collapse. 165
During the 1905-1907 revolution, the regime dispatched troops not only to
supress disorders, but also to deter them through the intimidating presence
of military guard details. ... The Ministry of War, however, accepted
neither the erosion of its financial position nor its expanding repressive
obligations.
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But the real heart of civil-military conflict in Imperial Russia inhered in the clashes
between the autocracy, the civilian ministries, and the Ministry of War about the purpose
of the army. Civilian ministers tended to regard the army as a resource on which they
could draw. "Russia's increasingly professional military leaders, however, more and more
adhered to the view that the army had one purpose and one purpose only : training for
war."
167 These attitudes were founded in the beginning and development of military
professionalism which in Russia grew steadily stronger between 1881 and 1914. But the
total leavening of professionalism within the Russian officer corps remained small, and the
War Ministry could not establish a professional officer corps by decree. There were too
many structural problems, derived from Russia's political, economic, and social
backwardness, which militated against professionalism.
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In fact, in Imperial Russia military professionalism and civil-military
conflict fueled each other. The more professional the military elite became,
the more vigorously it pushed for the modernization of the military arsenal
and the creation of a truly national, patriotic army. Conversely, the more
the autocrats and civilian bureaucrats frustated these goals, the more firmly
officers adhered to their professional program. 168
There was, of course, no military coup in Russia during this period of Imperial
Russia from 1861 until 1917. However, as it has often and correctly been pointed out, the
abdication of Nicholas II in March 1917 can in part be construed as a military coup.
Nicholas decided to renounce his power only after almost all of his front commanders had
urged him to do so. 169 Many explanations of the abdication tend to concentrate on the
army's frustrations at the mismanagement of the war. Fuller argues, in contrast, that the
officers' resentment against civilian treatment of the army had a pre-history which long
antedated August 1914. In summary, civil-military conflict of the variety which emerged in
late Imperial Russia was dysfunctional.
This was not only because the tension underlying the conflict contributed
to the downfall of the Romanov dynasty, but also because the energies
squandered on this conflict could have been productively expended in the
solution of other problems. ...
An expansion in military professionalism was, of course, a feature of other
European armies. But the Russian military professionals were almost
unique in their lack of prestige and lack of natural allies. Unlike the
Austro-Hungarian armed forces, the Russian army had no role as an
agency for the resolution or the suppression of nationalism. Unlike the
German officer corps, the Russian officer corps enjoyed low prestige and
was popularly reviled by the educated classes. Unlike the French army, the
Russian army could rely on little political support either from the left or
from the right, ...
By the summer of 1914 the relations between army and Duma, army and
autocrat, and army and bureaucracy were characterized by mistrust and
suspicion, which did not bode well for the conduct of the war effort. 170
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Fuller argues that, contrary to what has often been said of it, the cream of the
officer corps in Imperial Russia was politicized. But the capital weakness of the politics of
this military elite was superficiality. Imperial Russian military politics was interest group
politics. "The politicized officers were lobbyists, not statemen." 171 Numerous officers of
Imperial Russia who joined the Whites were new professionals and in fact politicized. But
their politics were narrow and consequently flawed. The White movement did not have a
unified political ideology. Mere opposition to Bolshevism was too barren a program to
unify soldiers, politicians, and population. So, too, was a concern for the preservation of
the army. Fuller comes to the following conclusion :
The real problem which military professionals confronted in late Imperial
Russia was the inability of the regime to find a place for them. The tsarist
government was unable ... to generate institutions which could mediate
between bureaucracy and army. Further, the autocracy was also unready to
grant the army more autonomy, since military autonomy was itself a
contradiction of the autocratic principle. Civil-military conflict was the
unavoidable result. 172
B. SOVIET UNION
The society of the Soviet Union was militarized, and civil-military relations were
dominated by the party-state system until 1991
.
In 1917 Vladimir I. Lenin destroyed the Provisional Government's control of the
military while winning the loyalty of some military units deployed in the capital. Without
this success the communist revolution in Russia never could have happened. 173 Later the
removal of Leo D. Trotsky from the Red Army command was an important step in Joseph
W. Stalin's campaign against his archenemy.
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Stalin, who jealously guarded his power against any personal or
institutional challenges, made a special effort, through a mixture of terror
and privileges, to ensure the military's political quiescence. No other
government branch was purged as thoroughly or urgently as the Red Army
during the Great Terror — probably because Stalin saw the military as the
greatest potential threat to his personal power in any crisis; once the
military was purged, Stalin felt free to unleash unlimited terror against the
whole society. 174
After Stalin, the communist party with its enormous bureaucracy controlled the
military effectively until the middle of 1990, when the Communist Party was no longer the
main political force in the Soviet Union. With the failed August Coup in 1991 it became
obvious that the Communist Party had lost the power.
A military coup in the Soviet Union was unlikely because there was no tradition of
successful military coups in Russian / Soviet history. "It is equally established in the
Russian / Soviet tradition, however, that whenever the civilian authority is weakened by a
succession of crisis or by a revolutionary upheaval, no government can survive without
controlling the military or receiving its political support."
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The Russian writer Yurii Boriev compared in 1990 the history of the Soviet Union
to a train in motion.
The train is speeding into a luminous future. Lenin is at the control.
Suddenly — stop, the tracks come to an end. Lenin calls on the people for
additional, Saturday work, tracks are laid down, and the train moves on.
Now Stalin is driving it. Again the tracks end. Stalin orders half the
conductors and passengers shot, and the rest he forces to lay down new
tracks. The train starts again. Krushchev replaces Stalin, and when the
tracks come to an end, he orders that the ones over which the train has
already passed be dismanteled and laid down before the locomotive.
Brezhnev takes Krushchev's place. When the tracks end again, Brezhnev
decides to pull down the window blinds and rock the cars in such a way
that the passengers will think the train is still moving forward. 176
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And thus the Soviet Union came to the Epoch of the Brezhnev's, Andropov's,
Chemenko's, during which the passengers of the train do not even have the illusion that
they are going anywhere.
But then, in April 1985, the train starts to move again. This is its last journey,
however. It will last six and a half years. This time Gorbachev is the engineer, and
the slogan GLASNOST - PERESTROIKA is painted on the locomotive. 177
The crisis of the Communist system ~ and concomitantly of the Soviet Union ~
became increasingly profound, clear, and sharp in 1985. Communist parties in Western
countries collapse and lose their meaning. Poland's Solidarity, despite the repressive
power of martial law, creates a permanent and widening breach within an actual Socialist
system. Moscow, increasingly falls behind in the arms race with the West, lags more and
more visibly with its outdated technology and low labor productivity, loses position after
position in the game to control the world.m
In such a situation, in March 1985, on Andrey Gromyko's recommendation,
Mikhail Gorbachev became secretary-general of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union. "In some sense perestroika and glasnost are the artificial lungs
hooked up to the increasingly enfeebled, dying organism of the USSR. Thanks to them,
the USSRwill survive for another six and a half years." 179
The foundation of the Soviet Imperium was terror and fear. "Because the Kremlin
abandons the politics of mass terror with the death of Stalin and Beria, one can say that
their departure is the beginning ofthe end of the Imperium." 180
After five years of great effort and tension, Gorbachev was increasingly fatigued,
disoriented, and nervous. He lost his initiative and dynamism, and his politics, until 1990
so creative and, given Russian circumstances, so innovative and extraordinary, became
routine, indecisive, concessionary.
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In December 1990, his minister of international affairs and a tried-and-true
ally, Eduard Shevardnadze, warns publicly that the country's conservative
forces are preparing a coup d'etat and offers his resignation. Gorbachev
doesn't react.
181
Then the critical year 1991 arrived. On 19 August 1991, a three-day coup began.
The coup failed and Gorbachev returned from the Crimea. But no one listened to
Gorbachev any longer; he had ceased to interest people.
Gorbachev must feel increasingly alone. He is still enormously popular in
the West. The West would like to live in harmony with the rulers of the
Kremlin, but it has one condition — that they be likable, that they smile,
that they be well dressed, relaxed, cheerful, humorous, courteous. And
now, after six hundred years of hopeless waiting, such a man appears :
Gorbachev ! London and Paris, Washington and Bonn, all open wide their
arms, rejoice. What a discovery ! What a relief ! 182
After the August coup Gorbachev resigned as secretary-general of the CPSU. The
center of power had moved to the president of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin. On
his initiative the resolution came to create a new union — the Commonwealth of
Independent States. On 25 December 1991 Gorbachev resigned as president of the USSR.
The red flag with the hammer and sickle was removed from the Kremlin. The USSR had
ceased to exist.
1. The Party-State System
The relative autonomy of the military and its relations with the party in communist
political systems vary from one country to another. Perlmutter describes these civil-
military relations as (1) coalitional, (2) symbiotic, (3) orfused.
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The relations are dynamic, and the role of the military in politics is complex and
variegated; "on ideological issues, there is usually little conflict between party and army;
on issues of normal politics, the military act as a functionally specified elite engaged in
bargaining to defend its perceived institutional interests; and in crisis politics, the military
is a political resource that various party factions seek to enlist against their opponents." 184
No communist system could have been established without resort to the armed
forces, but these regimes do not live by force alone. Once a communist state has been
established, the pattern of regime development depends upon the relationship among
party, armed forces, and state, the iron triangle of communist systems, and the practice of
politics is essentially bureaucratic in the sense that political conflicts are resolved within
the confines of hierarchically organized structures.
A particular communist system has two characteristics. 185 First, in the economy,
private enterprise is subordinated to state property and central planning. Second, in the
polity, all political and administrative structures are subordinated to a hegemonic party.
The extent of party hegemony depends upon how successfully the party exerts control
over nonparty institutions.
There are two clear examples of how complex, fluid, and potentially unstable the
autonomy-subordination relationship in communist systems is : (1) the state-party
relations; (2) the civil-military relations. All in all, the fundamental structural feature of
communist systems is the party-state.
2. The Military in the Party-State
Perlmutter describes and compares three more permanent, structural facets of the
relationship.
186 At the ideological level the military, like all political structures, is
constitutionally subordinate to the party. At the microlevel ofpolitics party and military
elites are among the most integrated elites in the party. The systemic level of politics
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concerns the the functional relationship among bureaucratic structures. Then Perlmutter
describes, for analytic purposes, three basic ideal types of army-party relationships :
(1) A coalitional relationship (Soviet Union) is one of mutual benefit for the
partners, a combination facing internal and external adversaries. It is a political relationship
in which the participants maintain relative equality and independence from one another.
The Soviet Armed Forces never aspired either to rule, to subordinate the party, or to act
as the regime's praetorian guard. The relationship in the USSR changed dynamically from
dependency to symbiosis and coalition, and in the last period to the professional soldier.
But the party was the Soviet sovereign, and the military may have challenged the party
elite or parts of it but never the party itself.
(2) A symbiotic relationship (China) is more organic than a coalitional one,
because it is a system of living together, a partnership involving one another, and is
associated with the survival of each institutional structure. The symbiotic relationship is
characterized by low level of differentiation between military and nonmilitary elites, and
the circulation of elites between military and nonmilitary posts. But the more professional
the military becomes and the more sophisticated its technology, the more likely it is that
the relationship will evolve away from symbiosis toward coalition.
(3) A fused relationship (Cuba). Cuba had the first successful socialist revolution
without a Leninist party. The collapse of the Batista regime in 1959 was brought about by
a guerrilla army, and the 26th July Movement, headed by Fidel Castro, was in no sense a
party. In contrast, through the first six years of Cuban revolutionary government, the
guerrilla army, transformed into the Revolutionary Armed Forces, acted as both party and
army. The fundamental difference between China and Cuba in this period was the
existence in China of a Marxist-Leninist party capable of directing the political system
after the seizure of power. Therefore, the legacy of guerrilla war in China was symbiosis,
and in Cuba it was fusion.
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3. Civil-Military Conflict
The specific details of civil-military relations in any communist political system
naturally depend upon the specific historical circumstances under which the revolutionary
elite seize power.
187 But in all cases, the party plays the leading role in society. The
party-army relationship in a communist system has the following relatively constant
characteristics : a party-dominant authority structure, a high level of elite integration, and
a complex institutional relationship that combines elements of both subordination and
autonomy. The most distinctive characteristic of civil-military relations is the role assumed
by the military during severe factional conflict within the party itself.
But even when the military intervenes in such factional conflicts, it
intervenes on behalf ofthe party .... In times of crisis, the officers may well
be the most strategic faction of the political elite, but they are still party
man.
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To recapitulate, this chapter focused on civil-military relations in Russian history
from late Imperial Russia until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. It is important to
keep in mind two main aspects from the analysis of Russian history before analyzing the
Russian Federation / Russia today.
(1) The military in Russian / Soviet history never took power for itself.
(2) The development during the last months of the Soviet Union defy the theories
of civil-military relations because the authors focus on the interaction of two actors, the
Communist Party and the military.
By the middle of 1990, however, the Communist Party was no longer the
political force in the Soviet Union. New and suddenly powerful political
forces were beginning to define the civil-military relations in the
disintegrating empire, leaving Western social science behind : for example,
the recent study of civil-military relations in the Soviet Union . . . paid little
attention to ethnic issues. 189
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VI. ASPECTS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS -
RUSSIAN FEDERATION/RUSSIA
The following chapter is very complex and touches on many important issues. For
example, domestic policy, constitutional and governmental aspects, foreign and security
policy, budget crises and economy, ethnic problems, military, history, and the interaction
of these issues are all important concerning the analysis of democratization and problems
of civil-military relations in Russia.
But in this study it is not possible to analyse all of these relevant aspects in detail;
therefore, this chapter analyses civil-military relations and its problems in the Russian
Federation / Russia during and after the collapse of the Soviet Union by focusing on two
selected issues : (A.) Russian Foreign and Security Policy; (B.) the Russian Armed Forces
in State and Society.
Why focusing on foreign and security policy as well as on armed forces in state in
society ? The answer depends on two additional questions.
First, what is the national interest of Russia ? The national foreign and security
policy is only one aspect in the analysis of civil-military relations ~ but a key aspect.
The ordering of its civil-military relations ... is basic to a nation's military
security policy. The objective of this policy on the institutional level is to
develop a system of civil-military relations which will maximize military
security at the least sacrifice of other social values. 190
Second, what's going on with the Russian military ? The Russian military wields
the power to defend the process of democratization and also has the power to stop this
process.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Russian Federation /
Russia is divided into three stages. First, the period of the destruction of the old Soviet
system. Second, the period of transition toward democracy. Third, the period of
consolidation of the new order.
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ODonnell and Schmitter argue that "... the transition is over when abnormality is
no longer the central feature of political life ... " 191 They define the first open elections as
the end of transition to democracy. By using this minimal-definition, Russia's transition
toward democracy was successful. Since 1993 there have been two open elections in
Russia. Furthermore, the constitution of the Russian Federation defines Russia as a
democracy in which human and civil rights are protected by the state as the supreme
values.
Art. 1.-1. The Russian Federation / Russia is a democratic and federal
state based on the rule of law, with a republican form of government. 2.
The names Russian Federation and Russia are equivalent.
Art. 2. - Human beings and their rights and liberties are the supreme
values. The recognition, observance and protection of human and civil
rights and liberties is the obligation of the state. 192
However, Linz and Stepan define a consolidated democracy as a political situation
in which democracy has become behaviorally, attitudinally, and constitutionally the only
game in town. 19* By using this definition, present Russia is neither a democracy nor a
consolidated democracy. By contrast, Russia can be described as a paper democracy
because democracy as the only game in town is existing only on the paper of the
191 O'Donnell, Guillermo and Schmitter, Philippe C, Transition from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore and London : The Johns Hopkins University Press,
Fourth Impression, 1993, p. 65.
192 The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, "Russia's Parliamentary Elections 1993 and 1995. Includes the
text of the 1993 Russian Constitution," Columbus, Ohio. 1996, p. 40.
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Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore and London : The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 19%, pp. 5-6.
(1) Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant national,
economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their
objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede
from the state.
(2) Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion holds
the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective
life in a society such as theirs and when the support for antisystem alternatives is quite small or more or
less isolated from the pro-democratic forces.
(3) Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental
forces alike, throughout the territory of the state, become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of
conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process.
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constitution. Russia finds itself currently in a situation in which elements of the old system
still mingle with the forerunners of the new order. This process seems extremly difficult,
and there is no guarantee of success for democracy.
Why is the process of democratization is so difficult in Russia ? In the Russian
Federation / Russia today most of the problems concerning transition, development and
consolidation of democracy are not solved, and too much still remains of the old system,
of the former Soviet Union : 194
(1) the old nomenclature ~ the governmental, economic, military, and police
bureaucracy;
(2) several important armed forces — Border Troops, Internal Troops, Russian
Armed Forces (Navy, Strategic Rocket Forces, Air Defense Forces, Air Forces,
Ground Forces), Civil Defense Troops, Railroad Troops and Construction Troops,
Cossacks;
(3) the security and intelligence establishment within the Ministry of Interior and
parts of the powerful KGB which have survived;
(4) all of middle and heavy industry is still in the hand of the state;
(5) the state is still dominant as landowner;
(6) the whole sphere of old habits of thought, of social behavior, and of benighted
views that had been inculcated into people for decades;
(7) the old legal system;
(8) the awareness of the terror and repression, of the persecutions that began in
1917 and that lasted for decades, assuming in certain years the character of mass
extermination;
(9) the universal poverty of this society, the poverty of apartments, the poverty of
the kitchen, the poverty of life;
(10) the taggering demoralization of significant portions of society — the growth of
all types of gangs, the terror exercised by armed bands. In addition, the ubiquitous
presence of the most diverse mafias, reaching as far as the highest rungs of power.
The active and impudent black market in weapons, including missiles. The defiant
Kapuscinski, Ryszard, Imperium, New York : Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1994, pp. 324-325.
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and terrifying thievery. Epidemic corruption. Alcoholism, rape, cynicism, as well as
omnipresent, common churlishness;
(1 1) the ecological depredations including nuclear-waste dumps;
(12) and last but not least the enormous ethnic problems and armed conlicts inside
Russia as well as along the frontiers of the Russian Federation.
A. RUSSIAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
The foreign policy of a state defines in the broadest sense the major tasks for its
military.
195 But Russian foreign policy has hardly been consistent in the last years,
evolving as it was under the constraints ofmany factors, internal and external, but it shows
distinct shifts and trends.
The discussion concerning the Russian way today and in future is divided into a
more pessimistic camp196 and a more optimistic camp. 191 The more pessimistic camp
argues that Russia's shift toward a foreign policy of the "near abroad" brings Russia back
to imperialism and empire-building ~ to restore as much as possible of the former Soviet
Union. This camp considers that Russian foreign policy became more aggressive and the
Russian military doctrine became more offensive in 1993. Russia could move again toward
a kind of totalitarianism and hegemony or anarchy. The more optimistic camp argues that
Russia seems for the first time in its history to have a real opportunity of becoming a
democratic, prosperous, cooperative member of the international community.
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The West naturally welcomed this prospect without reserve, in the native
belief that the new Russia could be transformed almost overnight into a
democratic, loyal, and above all unquestioning, supporter of Western
policy. That naive euphoria, that belief in the mutation of history, had been
replaced by a growing unease, both within Russia and outside. 198
Russia's present situation is a very dangerous and explosive mixture of different
factors. The political situation of Russia is intricate and unstable in domestic policy as well
as in foreign policy. Solid information and insights about what is really going on have been
hard to come by. President Boris Yeltsin is a sick man, and doubts arise over who's really
in charge in Russia. The development of the economy — a keystone in the process to
establish and consolidate a viable democracy ~ isn't very successful. Government and
economy are influenced by three major lobbies.
As significant lobbying groups must, the fuel and power complex, the
military-industrial complex and the agro-industrial complex have
representatives in federal bodies of power, in the provinces, in financial and
banking circles, in the political parties, in the trade unions and in the news
media. Basically, they have their people everywhere. 199
Initially, the Yeltsin government had to develop two foreign policies, one for the
"far abroad" (the remainder of the world), the other for the "near abroad" (the former
USSR).
The Russian policy toward the "far abroad" has three axis :
(1) West (Europe and North America);
(2) South (the subcontinent and the Middle East);
(3) East (East Asia).
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In 1992 and 1993, Yeltsin's foreign policy on the West axis not only maintained
but even expanded the cooperative approach of the last three years of the Gorbachev
period. On the South axis, Russia was neither uncooperative with the United States nor
very active. On the East axis, Yeltsin tried to follow up on the breakthroughs of
Gorbachev's policy, beginning with a rapprochement with China, expanded ties with
South Korea, and improved relations with Japan.
In the late 1993, Russian foreign policy shifted from its initial status quo
orientation, aimed at doing nothing to reserve the loss of Moscow's control over the
former Soviet republics, to a careful but assertive policy on the South axis, aimed at
reestablishing Moscow's hegemony based both on formal arrangements within the CIS and
on the physical presence of Russian military in as many of the CIS members as possible.
"As Yeltsin and his foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, took a much harder line toward
Russia's "near abroad," Moscow seemed to have reached a de facto consensus on
restoring as much of the old Soviet empire as possible under the banner of the CIS."200
The centre of gravity in Russia's foreign policy shifted from the "far abroad" to the "near
abroad" and is still there. "In the spring and fall of 1993, President Boris Yeltsin adopted
an assertive foreign policy concept and a military doctrine that appeared to define Russia's
periphery not only as the zone of Russian vital national interests but also as the possible
area for Russian unilateral military interventions." 201
On the one hand, Russia's long-range military doctrine could become more
aggressive, and Russsia's military strategy could become more offensive. Russia's
conventional armed forces are weak. Especially the experiences of the Chechen War have
underlined the wicked condition of the Russian armed forces. But Russia is still a strong
nuclear power. On the other hand, Russia needs help to be successful in the process of
democratization.
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Another influence of foreign policy on democratic transition and
consolidation concerns what we might call gate opening to democratic
efforts. ...a regional hegemon may, by a consistent policy package of
meaningful incentives and disincentives, play a major supportive ... role in
helping a fledgling democracy in the region complete a democratic
transition and consolidate democracy. 202
Rodic Braitwaite underlines three important aspects :
(1) A first step is to treat Russia as a major power, an equal member in
good standing of the international community : Yeltsin's demand, as it was
the demand of Peter the Great.
(2) The Russians must of course accept the independence of countries of
the former Soviet Union. It is a fact, not a threat, that any violation of that
independence would bring about a most serious deterioration in Russia's
relations with the West. But the West has also to accept that Russia has a
legitimate interest in the preservation of peace on their borders and that the
presence of large Russian minorities in many of those countries given rise
to objective problems which have nothing to do with neo-imperialism.
(3) The West must support as best it can the process of economic reform
inside Russia itself. But perhaps the most useful thing the outside world
can do is to help Russia remain open. 203
Since Peter the Great Russsia has usually been feared, if not always respected, by
its neighbors, and whether Russians like it or not, Russia is, and will remain, a great
European power. To bring Russia into a fruitful and cooperative relationship with the rest
of the modern world is surely the greatest prize for Russian and Western politicians alike.
"To despair, to fall back into the attitudes of the past — whether those of the Cold War or
those of the nineteenth century — would be a negation of statemanship."204
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the Federal Republic of Germany toward Portugal in 1974.
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But Russia must accept the rules of the game to get this international support ~
peace, democracy, and human rights. A Russian foreign policy with the intention to
restore the former Soviet Union, a more aggressive Russian military doctrine as well as a
more offensive military strategy are a violation of these rules of the game.
1. Russia and the "far abroad"
Sergei Blagovolin, formerly a professor at the Institute for International
Economics and International Relations (IMEMO), offered in 1993 a foreign policy toward
the "far abroad." 205 He focused first on the many political and economic processes at work
in the rest of the world, particulary the world economy, the European Community, NATO,
technological change, and the transnational social and cultural forces giving the West a
distinctive and attractive character. His intention was to counter the opinion still dominant
in Russian military and reactionary political circles; therefore, he took pains to explain why
liberal democracies, owing to their internal constraints, could not pose serious offensive
military threats to Russia.
Blagovolin reviewed the three axes for Russian policy within this larger
international context. In his analysis the West axis took priority, and his goal there was to
see Russia become part of the Western economic, political and cultural community.
Only by succeeding with its domestic transformation to a liberal political and
economic system could Russia hope to join that community. In Blagovolin s view a great
power status would naturally arise through a cooperative relationship with the United
States. If the United States takes an appropriate leading role in these regions it will need
Russia as a key partner because both states are deeply involved in Europe and Asia. "No
other state can join the United States in balancing the two key areas of the world ... thus
Russia's status is not threatened but rather ensured by aligning with the West." 206
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Blagovolin warned Russians against the temptation to try to split Europe from the
United States, because such a move would destroy the very community Russia must join in
order to become a modern and prosperous liberal society. He treated the disintegration of
the West as Russia's greatest external threat, an eventuality that would leave Russia alone,
outside a stable international system. Concerning Russia's "near abroad," Blagovolin
judged the maintenance of stability ~ especially in Eastern Europe — as beyond Russia's
means, and he welcomed the entry of Eastern European states into NATO.
But in his opinion the CIS States (including Russia) should not join NATO because
they do not yet have the domestic political conditions or professional militaries to
participate effectively. He also believed that all should strive for expanded security
relations with NATO and dependency on the Western security system, within NATO as
the system's foundation, not the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE). "Within the CIS ... no state other than Russia had adequate military power to
play a stabilizing role, but the CIS should not try to become another NATO; CIS members
simply do not share enough in common to make such an alliance work."207 In Blagovolin s
view the "far abroad" was more important to Russia's security than the "near abroad."
"The road to Russian security lead through Washington and Bonn (Berlin), not through
Dushanbe, Tashkent, and Tbilisi."208
2. Russia and the "near abroad"
Alexander Rutskoi as well as Vladimir Zhirinovsky opened the way to this policy.
Both old communists and new Russian nationalist-patriotic spokesmen shared their
opinions and offered demagogic rhetoric if not clear policy concepts in support of the
policy of "near abroad."
Vice-President Rutskoi was the highest-level spokeman for this position in 1993.
He argued that no serious military threats to Russia existed, but he insisted that military
affairs are dynamic, that a few states are acquiring greater military potential, including
207
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nuclear weapons, and that the present peaceful state of affairs could be short-lived. "For
Russia specifically ... the large "possible threat" would be the movement of military forces
into states on the CIS boarder. Other and more immediate threats were civil wars within
the CIS, including Russia."
209
In Rutskoi's view the potential adversaries were the United States, Western
Europe, and China, since only they could possibly move large forces into Eastern Europe
or along the CIS boarders in the East. He also mentioned possible rearmament by Japan.
Notwithstanding the potential for adversarial relations with these states, he
prescribed expanded relations and policies of cooperation with them all. ...
When he voiced concern about states' acquiring greater military potential,
including nuclear weapons, that could pose a threat to Russian territory, he
might well have had in mind other CIS states, including Ukraine, Belarus,
and Kazakhstan, as well as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. 210
The primary focus of Rutskoi's policy were the former Soviet republics. According
to him, the CIS and the Baltic states must be a single strategic space, tied firmly in a
collective security system and supported by a military development program through the
year 2000. First, he proposed for Russian foreign policy a thinly veiled formula for
reclaiming the old Soviet borders as well as Russian "great power" status on all three axes.
Second, Rutskoi encouraged cautious cooperation with the West and Japan, and his
position on practical matters like relations with former Warsaw Pact states and the Baltic
republics was to consider their inclusion in NATO wholly unacceptable, a direct threat to
Russia. Third, cooperation with the United States in the Middle East and Southwest Asia
was secondary to maintaining Russia's influence in these two regions.
This is not a status quo foreign policy. In contrast, it is a formula for regaining lost
power and prestige, obviously requiring considerable Russian military policy. Furthermore,
it seems to put foreign policy above domestic reforms as a priority. The important reason
for not dismissing such foreign policy aims is that Rutskoi's arguments were "... effectively
209
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a summary of the strategic thinking within the defense ministry in 1992, thinking that
persisted there and among conservative political circles in 1993 and 1994, and that may
have been the basis for policies implemented in 1 993-94.
"
2"
3. Selected Aspects of Russian Foreign Policy
NATO Enlargement
Should NATO enlarge ? Freezing NATO into its Cold War configuration would
itself be a huge mistake, a major setback both for the democratic nations that hope to join
the alliance and for the alliance interest in supporting democratic institutions. "By contrast,
enlarging NATO in a way that encourages European integration and enhances European
security ... will be benefit all the people of the continent, and the larger transatlantic
community as well."212
When NATO approaches the borders of the Russian Federation, you can
say that there will be two military blocs, and this will be a restoration of
what we have already had 213
There is no doubt about it that NATO's intention of enlargement is on a collision
course with Russian intentions. First, in the four years since U.S. President Bill Clinton
said that the question of expanding NATO is no longer whether NATO will take on new
members, but when and how, the issue has become much more complex. 214 Second, other
factors, such as Russia's shriller and more threatening opposition to the idea, are also
raising concerns.
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They want to take the countries ofEastern, Western, and Central Europe
and stuff them with nuclear arms... . Will Russia permit this ? No and no
again. Too many countries have taken measures to eliminate nuclear
weapons. To deploy them again in Eastern and Central Europe would be
madness.™
Third, a few former members of the Soviet bloc are worried that admitting some
countries into NATO might jeopardize the security of those remaining outside the
organization. In its military negotiations and diplomacy with Europe and the United
States, Russia was highly cooperative in 1992 and most of 1993. But by the winter of
1993-94 Moscow began to back away from its pattern of extensive cooperation, and
Yeltsin and Kozyrev began to speak of Russian interests that would limit cooperation in
the future. The Russian military managed to influence foreign policy to entangle Moscow
in a new imperialism aimed at controlling Central Asia and the Transcaucasus at a
minimum and, at a maximum, at bringing Belarus, Ukraine, Moldavia, and possibly the
Baltic states back into a unified military and economic relationship with Moscow. 216 To
the degree that the maximum goal is attained, Russia will also become more assertive in
Eastern Europe. With an understanding of these dynamics and factors within Russia, more
light can be shed on the issues ofwar and peace, stability and instability, in Central Asia, in
the Transcaucasus, and in Eastern Europe. It also underlines the risk of NATO
enlargement. But even if Russia did not accept the arrangement, Brzezinski, former U.S.
national-security adviser, dismissed in February 1995 the possibility of an aggressive
Russian response.
Threatened by the new Muslim states to the south and facing a possible
future conflict in the east, today's Russia is in no position to engage also in
a conflict with the West... Moscow can perhaps delay somewhat the
enlargement ofNATO, but it can neither halt Europe's growth nor prevent
the concomitant extension of the Euro-Atlantic security umbrella over the
wider Europe. It can merely isolate itself again. 217
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Transcaucasus and Central Asia
In the Soviet era, both Turkey and Iran faced a Soviet monolith on their northern
border. Neither country had influence in the Caucasus, and both sought to defend
themselves against Soviet expansionism. But the appearance of three small republics on
Turkey's and Iran's border transformed the local environment, leaving Turkey and Iran
with weak neighbors to their north.
The post-Soviet situation in the Transcaucasus has potentially grave implications
for both countries. Although at this time Russian hegemony seems guaranteed, and
conflict between Turks and Iranians is unlikely, the potential for disorder and
violence in the region remains. 218
In the Soviet era, the Central Asian countries, as republics of the USSR, did not
have independent international relations. "The Soviet state kept foreign influence out of
Central Asia, restricting the interaction between Central Asians and foreigners."219
Therefore, when the Central Asian republics attained independence, it was difficult to
guess what their international posture would be. Some observers thought that the new
Central Asia would reestablish ties to the Moslem world, possibly under the influence of
radical Islamists. Others speculated that China's influence might move westward to
encompass the new republics. Still others believed that a new Turkic community could
arise from the Turkestan of old. By 1994, the outline of Central Asia's international
relations had become clearer.
Russia remained the dominant power, with hegemony in military, political,
and economic affairs. All other foreign countries were considerably less
influential in the region, though all had seen their presence increase greatly
since Soviet days. 220
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The dropping of the Iron Curtain along the southern Soviet border exposed two
regions on the periphery of that empire ~ the Transcaucasus and Central Asia — to
neighboring regions with which they had long been close before Soviet rule. For example,
the famous Silk Road between Europe and China had traversed Central Asia and brought
the region cultural, economic, and political influence from the Orient. Also Persians and
Turks fought over the Transcaucasus for centuries. The North Caucasus and the Black
See figured in the 19th century Great Game of imperial competition between Great Britain
and Russia. It seems that Central Asia and the Transcaucasus could come under a new
Russian hegemony.
Despite Moscow's claim that it was acting as peacemaker, it was
becoming obvious by 1994 that Russian military involvement has increased
violence and sustained civil war in both regions. ... With the opening of
Central Asia and the Transcaucasus to the outside world, the region's
relations with countries to its south, from Turkey to China, became an
issue. As eight new players joined the diplomatic game, new alignments
throughout central Eurasia became possible. So far, however, no foreign
actor has displaced Russia as the dominant influence on the region. 221
East Asia
Moscow's leaders recognize that international threats to Russia's security and
well-being are minimal when compared to the acute domestic sources of instability. Unless
the economy can be reformed and a stable democratic political system created, catastrophe
looms.
Russian foreign policy is directed at securing the economic assistance from the
outside world that the country so desperately needs. In regard to the Asia-Pacific region,
this orientation leads to the following Russian goals : 722
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(1) the sharp expansion of trade;
(2) the procurement of credits, technology, and investment, especially from South
Korea and Japan;
(3) the use of trade and foreign investment to develop the Russian Far East so that
seperatist tendencies will not grow in this key region and so that Russian Far East
will contribute to the process of economic rebirth throughout the country;
(4) the elimination of perceptions in the region that Russian military might is a
threat to other states;
(5) the establishment of stable, cordial relations so that Russia will not become the
target of hostile coalitions (e.g. Sino-Japanese alliance);
(6) the preventing of North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons, since this
would encourage nuclear proliferation and might lead to extensive Japanese
militarization.
B. RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES IN STATE AND SOCIETY
The trauma and chaos induced in Russian military affairs by the breakup of the
Soviet Union are difficult and exaggerate.
A proud and ideologically indoctrinated officer corps witnessed the rapid
decline and disintegration of the Soviet military during Gorbachev's
perestroika policy. ... In retrospect, it is puzzling that the officer corps
sided with Yeltsin against Gorbachev as Yeltsin maneuvered in December
1991 to dissolve the Soviet Union. 223
The Russian military saw the CIS as merely a new version of the Soviet Union,
that is, as essentially a unified political entity with a unified military. By the spring of 1992,
that illusion was destroyed.
During the last six years the generals became involved in domestic politics during
the course of two violent upheavals. The first took place at the end of the Soviet Union in
August 1991 (the August Coup), when flag officers in key positions refused to obey their
Odom and Dujarric, p. 166.
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defense minister's orders. The second occured in Russia in 1993 (the October Mutiny),
when the high command initially made a collective decision to remain outside of politics in
the midst of a mutiny to unseat the commander-in-chief. "The two attempts to seize power
espoused similar objectives : to turn back the clock and restore the old USSR system
within its former geographic boundaries." 224 Both military interventions failed, the coup in
1991 as well as the mutiny in 1993, and in both cases the military did not assume political
power. Today it seems that the danger to democracy in Russia comes not from the threat
of military coups, but from the possibility that the military may participate in coalitions
with pro-communist or radical right political forces wanting to destabilize the status quo
or the development of democratic structures. 225
1. Russian Military Doctrine
The term military doctrine is fairly loosely used in Western writings, and in
Western parlance, it might better be translated as the state's military security policy. By
contrast, in the Soviet Union it had a rigid definition. "Consisting of two components,
social-political and military-technical, it was said to encompass the state's official view on
war, military forces, and preparations of war." 226
Because Marxism-Leninism split the world into two camps, socialist and
capitalist-imperialist, the military doctrine effectively defined the threat against which
Soviet forces had to prepare to fight — essentially the entire nonsocialist world.
Soviet military doctrine, therefore, was designed for dealing with the
inevitable showdown between socialism and capitalism. ... Military
doctrine, conceived in such broad terms, embraced a large part of the
entire buisness of governing within the Soviet state. Military doctrine in
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this system was never written down in any formal document. Its authority
derived from the ideology informing it and from its approval by the
communist's highest organ, the Politburo. ... Justification of its action to a
parliamentary body or to the public was out of the question. 227
During the post-Stalinist era, the Soviet military enjoyed considerable autonomy in
the areas of force structure, manpower, and troop welfare. This very important review of
what military doctrine has long meant to the present generation of Russian military leaders
is essential to an understanding of their obsession with developing and legitimizing a new,
Russian version of the doctrine. "They instinctively wanted it to perform all the functions
of the old one ~ defining the threat, justifying force structure, and dictating adequate
resources."
228
The current doctrine, signed by President Boris Yeltsin on 2 November 1993, has
been descibed as a transitional document.
It proclaims that the Russian Federation ... does not regard any state as an
enemy. However, the doctrine then proceeds to list ten potential sources of
danger, such as local wars, especially those to Russian borders;
discrimination against Russian citizens living abroad; and expansion of
military alliances to the detriment of Russia's security. 229
This doctrine mentions maintenance of stability in regions directly bordering on the
Russian Federation as well as in the former Soviet satellites. Then the document asserts a
sphere of influence that coincides with the one maintained by the USSR.
Russia's new armed forces were assigned three priority tasks through the end of
this century. First, to establish mobile forces to conduct operations in any region where a
threat may arrise. Second, to provide security for other members of the CIS, possibly by
deploying Russian troops on their territories. Third, to station troops outside of Russia,
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either together with units of another state or as exclusively Russian formations at their
own seperate bases.
The 1993 doctrine also included a section on military-technical support for the
armed forces with implementation of a long-range (10-15 years) program to develop new
weapons and other military hardware, as well as to procure more and more advanced
systems for the military.
No aspect of this doctrine had been unexpected in the West, and much in the
doctrine, e.g., "Russia has no enemies," consisted of merely declaratory statements for
Western consumption.
Nevertheless, the document gave the generals exactly what they wanted : a
definition of domestic missions for the army, a statement on Russia's
responsibilities in the "near abroad," and repudiation of the "no first use"
principle regarding nuclear weapons. ... The reversal in 1993 envisaged
first use of such tactical or strategic warheads against other nuclear
powers, their allies, and states not party to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation
ofNuclear Weapons. 230
Not surprisingly, this doctrine caused deep concern in the Central Asian and
Transcaucasus republics, e.g., President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan "... pointed out the
unnerving analogy between Russia's claim to protect Russians in other CIS states and
Hitler's assertion of authority over Sudeten Germans in 1938."231
A recent study, produced at the Institute for Defence Studies (Institut oboronnykh
issledovanii ~ INOBIS) and reportedly commissioned by the Ministry of Defense, seems
likely to become part of Russia's new long-range national security doctrine. The INOBIS
report begins with a discussion of threats to national security, in descending order of
magnitude. Note that in each case the West is said to be the source ofthe threat.
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INOBIS
Threats to Russia's National Security232
(1) Interference in the internal affairs of Russia by the United States and its
allies.
(2) Political and economic penetration of Azerbaijan by Turkey, the United
States, Britain, and Germany, with Azerbaijan serving as a bridgehead for
future Western expansion into Central Asia, the Volga region, and the
Northern Caucasus through exploitation of "Turkic" and "Islamic" factors.
(3) Attempts to isolate and remove Russia from Europe through an
expansion ofNATO that admits, in stages :
- Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary (within two or three
years);
- Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland, and Austria ~ possibly also
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (by the year 2000); and
- Ukraine (probably in 2005).
Under no circumstances will Russia ever be accepted into NATO, because
the two main proponents of expansion are Germany and the United States.
(4) Unilateral disarmament of Russia through :
- financing the degradation of Russian strategic weapons systems and R&D
centers;
- attempting to force acceptance of unequal treaties like START II;
- demanding amendments to the anti-ballistic missile agreement in an
atmosphere of "cold peace"; and
- counteracting integration within the CIS.
This study declares that if the Baltic states are invited to join NATO, Russian
armed forces should immediately occupy Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, because their
membership in NATO would represent no less a threat to Russia than Soviet nuclear
weapons in Cuba posed for the United States in 1962. Furthermore, this study includes
recommended strategies to neutralize the threats to Russia's national security.
Quoted by Staar, "Moscow's Plan to Restore Its Power," pp. 378.
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INOBIS
Recommended Strategies to Neutralize Threats to
Russia's National Security233
(1) to radically change economic relations by refusing to work with the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank;
(2) to review results from privatization of state property;
(3) to prevent the West from exploiting Caspian Sea oil;
(4) to block formation of territorial links between Turkey and Azerbaijan;
(5) to stop the eastward expansion of NATO by establishing a military
alliance of CIS members ~ without Ukraine;
(6) to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to :
- the Western Theater of Military Operations (teatr voennykb deistvii ~
TVD) ~ Belarus (where close bilateral military cooperation already exists),
the Kaliningrad special region, and warships on the Baltic Sea;
- the Northern TVD ~ along the Norwegian boarder and on the Barents
Sea; and
- the Southern TVD — at Russian bases in Crimea, Abkhazia, Georgia,
Armenia, and on the Black Sea.
The INOBIS study argues that this strategy is similar to that adopted by
NATO during the cold war, when tactical nuclear warheads were stored in
Western Europe.
In the event of a complete rupture in NATO-Russian relations, Russia should sell
nuclear and missile technology for military purposes to Iran, Iraq, and Algeria ~ after
radical Islamic forces have assumed control. Even a military alliance with Iran should not
be excluded because the West would not be willing or able to repeat a Desert Storm
operation once such weapons ~ Russian troops with tactical nuclear weapons — had been
deployed in Iran.
Quotedbyibid.,p. 379.
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In the first stage, the number of Russian strategic nuclear weapons should be
confined within START I. But in the second stage (beginning in 2009) the number of these
weapons must be expanded and modernized. Furthermore, INOBIS says, it is extremly
important to counter the United States plans for a tactical ABM system and the American
attemps to modify the 1972 treaty that would result in implementation of the Strategic
Defense Initiative.
Such developments would affect not only Russia and China but also India
and Pakistan — all members of the nuclear-arms club. In this connection,
Moscow may choose to deal with India in the same way that the United
States treated Great Britain when the former provided Polaris and Trident
missiles to carry British warheads. 234
In the third stage (long-range view) such cooperation might also be extended by
Russia to Iran and a number of other Muslim countries in Southwest Asia and North
Africa.
These aspects of the INOBIS report represents official thinking, concluded from
two events during February 1996. First, Viktor Mikhailov, the atomic energy minister and
member of the Security Council, told reporters that Russia would destroy all sites for
tactical nuclear weapons deployed by NATO in any East-Central European country.
"Although no plans for such deployment exist, Mikhailov equated NATO eastward
expansion with a policy of nuclear proliferation."235 Second, Generals Dmitrii Kharchenko
and Gennadii Ivanov, both advisors to Russian defense minister Pavel Grachev, told
members of a Swedish military commission visiting Moscow that Russia would withdraw
from the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and slow down compliance with
START I should Sweden, Finland, and the Baltic states become members of NATO.
"There would be other unforeseeable consequences, namely that Russian nuclear
weapons will be moved closer to the Nordic area and Central Europe" 136
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These threats may represent a form of blackmail, and Moscow may have no
intention of following through and implementing them. However, in Richard Staar's really
pessimistic view the INOBIS study seems likely to become part of Russia's new
long-range national security doctrine.
2. Russian Military Strategy
In this context military strategy means the use of military power in three cases. 237
First, the use of military power in wartime to defeat enemies. Second, the use of military
power in peacetime to support diplomacy and strategic and conventional deterrence.
Third, the use of military power generally to exert influence outside one's borders.
During the Soviet period, a complex array of warplans was developed and
practiced. The European "Theaters of military operations" (TVDs) had priority, but the
Far East and the Southern TVDs also received intensive attention. Four "groups of forces"
in East Europe played the key role in warplans for an offensive into Western Europe.
"Overall, Soviet warplans rested on the assumption that Soviet Union would seize the
offensive in all theaters from the beginning of conflict." 238
The new situation left the Russian military with virtually no implementable
warplans other than hasty variants for the defense of Russian territory. Progress in
developing new warplans confronted several difficulties in 1992-94.
As the defence ministry's preferences in foreign policy for the "near
abroad" began to win support from the foreign minister in the summer of
1993, and with the formal promulgation in November 1993 of a new
military doctrine stating Russia's strong interest in the ethnic-Russian
population in other CIS republics and the Baltic states, an inchoate strategy
became apparent. While a CIS armed forces had proven impractical to
create, Russia did not give up on tying the CIS into a common military
system.
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There is no doubt about the evolution of Russian policy in the "near abroad,"
specifically the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, and the increased role of the Russian
military in many of the conflicts in these republics. "Within the near abroad, only the
Baltic states were able to retain their independence from Russia and to remain outside the
CIS."
240
Beyond the territories of the former Soviet Union, Russia began to show its hand
again Eastern Europe in the fall of 1993. After Yeltsin told Poland and the Czech Republic
in July 1993 that Russia would not object to their joining NATO, he promptly reversed
himself. Concerning NATO expansion, General Grachev declared that Poland was a
military threat to Russia. As in January 1994 NATO summit meeting approached, and as
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary lobbied hard for admittance to
NATO, Moscow faced the prospect that indeed they might be admitted. "What role
Moscow actually played in denying them membership is ambiguous. Several NATO states
did not favor their admittance for reasons unrelated to Russia, but U.S. official statements
included domestic Russian politics as a factor in rejecting them.
Whatever the facts, Russian hardliners could claim afterwards that Russian
resistance had prevented NATO expansion and kept Eastern Europe open for greater
Russian influence." 241 In the latter half of 1993 and early 1994, Russian strategy, using a
mix of diplomacy, economic instruments, and military forces that had not been withdrawn
from several of the CIS countries, was taking a new and offensive shape.
In its military negotiations and diplomacy with Europe and the United States,
Russia was highly cooperative in 1992 and most of 1993. Russia contributed forces to UN
peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia and was cooperative in the UN Security
Council. But in the winter of 1993-94 Moscow began to back away from this pattern of
extensive cooperation, and Yeltsin and Andrei Kozyrev began to speak of Russian
interests that would limit cooperation in the future. "Yet given Russia's inherent weakness,
there are limits on how far it can go in asserting such interests against strong Western
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objections." 242 Today the Russian military strategy is reasonably coherent in some areas,
filled with contradictions in others, and only partly developed in yet other.
Although military establishments are generally expected to support and
help diplomats in carrying out foreign policy, the defense ministry
effectively usurped the foreign ministry's role in Russian policy toward the
CIS. After two years, defense ministry views were prevailing with Yeltsin,
and the foreign ministry was piping a wholly different tune, giving the
impression that a consensus had indeed been reached on foreign policy and
the requisite military strategy to back it. This is the most important finding
about Russian military strategy for assessing the prospects for stability and
peaceful development ... 243
3. Role and Mission of the Russian Armed Forces
Beside the Russian foreign and security policy, military doctrine and military
strategy, the problems of civil-military relations are obvious in the following four cases :
Russian manpower policy, military-industrial policy, command, control, and force
structure, and the Chechen War.
(1) Military manpower policy - No single issue captures the turmoil, difficulties,
and chaos within the Russian military as does the manpower policy. Conscription and
recruitment tie the military to every stratum of society, and poor morale arising from
horrible conditions in military units in turn stimulate public demands for changes. In
summary, the main problems are as follows : 244
- large troop withdrawals from Europe and the Baltic States;
- large armed forces reductions;
- reduction of the term of concripts to 18 months in February 1993 with a complex
new law On Military Obligation and Military Service,
- economic crisis;
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- budget crisis and problems of modern equipment, payment, manpower (especially
conscripts), and morale;
- corruption among the senior military because economic realities make
competition for personal income among the military elites inevitable for a long
time;
- ethnic problems and military involvement and wars in the "near abroad."
(2) Military industrial policy - Another main problem concerning civil-military
relations in Russia is the military-industrial sector. Odom and Dujarric summarize the
situation as follows
:
Both the military industrialists' image of their own capabilities and the
military theorists' fantasies about high-technology armed forces and their
feasibility suggest that these groups were either out of touch with their
own realities or ignorant of what is required to achieve the kind of
military-industrial capabilities that exist in the United States. A Russian
free market economy could possibly produce them within the next decade
or longer, but the old central planning structure could not be revived to
achieve them except through forced allocations at the expense of the rest
of the economy. 245
(3) Command, control, and force structure - The formal structure of political
institutions at the top of the Russian Federation is prescribed in the new constitution from
12 December 1993. It makes the president the supreme commander of the armed forces,
gives him appointive and removal powers over the military high command as well as the
right to confer military ranks, and requires that he approve military doctrine. 246
The government, controlling the ministry of defense and other so-called power
ministries (ministry of security and ministry of the interior), is the president's implementing
arm for his military duties. In the parliament, the Federation Council (e.g., the upper
chamber) has jurisdiction over questions of using military force outside the borders of the
Russian Federation, and it must examine all laws adopted by the Duma (e.g., lower
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chamber) concerning questions of war and peace. This allocation of powers and
responsibilities leaves unclear a number of key questions. Presumably the Federation
Council is the ultimate parliamentary authority in approving military actions by the
president, but the Duma apparently has some role if it can pass laws concerning questions
ofwar andpeace. More significant may be the lack of clarity in the constitution about the
ultimate power of the purse. The president and the government must propose a budget to
the Duma, and the Duma may revise it, but because the President can still rule by decree,
including decrees on expenditures of state funds, the locus of final fiscal authority remains
unclear. Moreover, authority over taxation suffers the same ambiguity. As long as much of
the military industrial capacity is controlled by state, and while the private economic sector
remains small, the locus of fiscal power for military spending is uncertain.
(4) Chechen War - Perhaps the Chechen War is one of the greatest disasters in
Russian military history. 247 There are many reasons for the failure of the Russian armed
forces in this war :
- the lack of lessons learned from Afghanistan,
- the lack of battle-readiness,
- the lack ofequipment and training,
- the lack ofhumanity;
- the lack of morale.
"The belief that the real rulers of Russia today are the mafia is as widespread
among Russian soldiers as in the society at large." 248 The dominant cliche to be heard on
the Chechen side was : "One Chechen is worth a hundred Russians." 249 In contrast, the
frequently heard cliche on the Russian side was : "A fish rots from the head." 230 The head
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in this case meant not just Yeltsin, but also Defense Minister Grachev and to an extent the
military hierarchy, ridled as it was and is with outrageous corruption and outright theft.
To recapitulate, this chapter focused on the Russian foreign and security policy as
well as the Russian armed forces in state and society. It is important to keep in mind three
main aspects.
(1) Russia still is a very important country in global prospectives, and it seems that
Russia will continue to be so at least in the near future. Furthermore, Russia is still a
multi-national country with enormous ethnic problems.
(2) But Russia must realize that an imperial Russian foreign and security policy of
Lebensraum with the intention to restore as much as possible of the former Soviet Union,
a more aggressive Russian military doctrine as well as a more offensive military strategy
are violations of the rules of the game of international peace and humanity. Russia must
realize that international support of the process of democratization depends on these rules
of the game — peace, democracy, human rights.
(3) The collapse of the Soviet Union has left the Soviet / Russian military with a
greater potential for political influence than under the old communist regime. Furthermore,
the incentives for the military to exert political influence ~ its self-interest — and
opportunities for doing so — lack of credible civilian institutions — are not likely to
disappear in the near future. The military in Russia is likely to continue to seek political
influence and is well positioned to do so. There are, however, considerable limitations on
the scope of political power the military is likely to attain. One limitation is that the
military, whatever its rhetoric, has proven to be primarily concerned about its corporate
interests. The other important limitation is that the Russian military pursues influence
within political alliances rather than political power for itself. 251
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VIL CONCLUSION
The study of theory and history brings an understanding about civil-military
relations and its problems in the process of democratization. This topic was and still is a
very important and sensitive issue in Germany as well as abroad. For example, the
Prussian-German General Staff has aroused strong emotions among other nations
concerned with Germany and contemporary military affairs during this century and before.
The men in their Prussian blue or field-gray uniforms with the crimson
facings have earned such epithets as brilliant militarists, the brains of
armies, geniuses of war, criminals against peace, foes ofdemocracy, and
technocrats oforganized violence
751
(1) The first main finding of this study is that the example of the Weimar
Republic underlines the relevance of a successful consolidation of democracy.
Democratization and the study of civil-military relations must not end with the successful
transition toward democracy because a viable democracy rather depends on a successful
consolidation. After World War I the transition toward democracy was successful. But
Weimar never was a consolidated democracy, and Weimar never solved the problems of
civil-military relations.
The failure of the first German democracy opened the way to the Third Reich.
After 1933 ~ in comparison to the democratic forces of the Weimar Republic — the
Fiihrer and Reichskanzler Adolf Hitler and his Nazis were much more successful in
consolidating their totalitarian system in Germany. The result was the second German bid
for European hegemony — the catastrophe ofWorld War II and the Holocaust.
The total defeat ofGermany in World War II and the allied intervention opened the
way for the process of democratization in West Germany. With support of the former
enemies ~ especially the United States — the Federal Republic of Germany became a
consolidated and viable democracy. Democracy became and still is the only game in town.
252 Donald Abenheim, in Millotat, Christian O.E., Understanding the Prussian - German General Staff
System , Carlisle Barracks, PA : U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1992, p. vii.
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Since German unification some observers fear that a unified Germany would
quickly take advantage of its new and powerful position in the heart of Europe, discard its
strong support for European integration and switch to a unilateral foreign and security
policy to further its influence in Europe and in the world.
As East and West Germany undergo the process of unification and
sovereignty restrictions disappear, the post-Second World War
circumstances that made West Germany an economic giant, but a political
dwarf, have changed irrevocably. The transformation of Germany into a
well-rounded great power, however, requires more than just quick policy
fixes. Germany's past role in international politics is still deeply etched in
the memories both of the people of Europe and elsewhere, and of
Germany's own policy-makers. 253
Germany has a specific historical responsibility and shame especially concerning
World War II and the Holocaust. Today Germany can look back on the longest period of
peace in its recent history, to which the Bundeswehr, side by side with the armed forces of
our allies, has made a crucial contribution. 254 The Federal Republic of Germany should use
any posibility to support the processes of democracy and human rights in the world.
... Germany has greater international responsibility, especially as far as
security in and for Europe is concerned. Much is expected of Germany
because of its central role, its potential and its history. Germany has
learned the lessons of history and will thus continue to pursue a policy of
active integration and broad international cooperation. 255
The concept of Innere Fuhrung is a key element of civil-military relations in
Germany. Despite all criticism this concept was and still is very successful at least in the
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German case. Irmere Fiihrung was born in a difficult time and proved itself in the old
Bundeswehr against hard challenges in every decade leading to unification.
(2) This leads to the second main finding of this study. Innere Fiihrung reflects a
permanent process with interdependent relations between state, society, and Bundeswehr.
It includes the three aspects which should characterize a modern concept of civil-military
relations :
- civilian control / civilian supremacy over the military in general;
- civil-military cooperation concerning national security issues;
- integration of the armed forces and soldiers into state and society.
The German Bundeswehr is very proud to be a democratic and professional army
on the basis of the Innere Fiihrung including civilian control / civilian supremacy as well as
civil-military cooperation {Primat der Politik), integration into state and society
(Staatsbiirger in Uniform), a high responsibility toward democracy {Politische Bildung -
Protector ofDemocracy), and high military skills {Auftragstaktik).
Today and in future Innere Fiihrung faces two great challenges from inside
Germany. First, with the warning of the Cold War and the inception of a dangerous and
unknown new world, the Bundeswehr has to prepare itself for missions outside the
traditional framework of NATO. Missions other than war are a problem because they
could politicise the soldiers in future. Such a politicization would be the opposite of the
concept of professionalism. However, Innere Fiihrung must solve this challenge
successfully. Second, if the Bundeswehr does become a volunteer army, Innere Fiihrung
will more than ever have to tie the soldier to his society, because the link of universal
military service, which bound the soldier and civil society together, will have been broken.
The era of the conscript army, which began with the French Revolution,
would appear to be fading into history. With it, presumably, will go the
close identification between citizen and soldier, people and army. 256
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Huntington, Samuel P., "Reforming Civil-Military Relations, " in Diamond Larry and Plattner, Marc
F. (editors), Civil-Military Relations and Democracy . Baltimore and London : The Johns Hopkins
University Press. 1996, pp. 10-11.
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The Bundeswehr and Innere Fiihrung must be able to handle both future
challenges ~ missions other than war and volunteer armed forces. Perhaps Innere
Fiihrung must be prepared to handle both challenges at once.
In addition, there is another great challenge for the concept of Innere Fiihrung
from outside Germany. Innere Fiihrung has become a model for new democracies
especially in Eastern Europe, when they consider how to rebuild their armed forces and to
solve the problems of civil-military relations in the ongoing process of transition towards
and consolidation of democracy. 257 These countries and also Russia have all approached
Germany and the German Bundeswehr for information about civil-military relations and its
key-aspect, Innere Fiihrung, in a democracy. They have approached the Bundeswehr
because of its proximity, historical ties, the success ofInnere Fiihrung in the German case,
and because the Bundeswehr is also a conscript army like theirs and has had immediate
experience in dealing with a socialist army, the National People's Army ~ Nationale
Volksarmee (NVA) ~ of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), with similar
organization, ethos, and problems.
Yet another reason given for the interest in the Bundeswehr and Innere Fiihrung is
the belief that the Bundeswehr is an example, perhaps the only example, of an army
successfully growing out of totalitarianism and into the service of a democratic society.
But this belief is questionable. We have to keep in mind some special circumstances before
using the German Bundeswehr and Innere Fiihrung as a positive example or in
comparison to other states.
(3) This leads to the third main finding of this study. The German case after the
collapse of Nazi Germany is very different concerning transition toward and consolidation
of democracy as well as civil-military relations especially in comparison to the case of
Russia after the collapse ofthe Soviet Union.
- Foreign and Security Policy - Germany's intentions of imperialism, hegemony
and Lebensraum came to an abrupt end with the total defeat in 1945. After the
catastrophe of World War II and the Holocaust Germany was divided for 45 years and
Federal Ministry of Defense, p. 132.
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also lost its ambitions to be a great power in global prospectives. In contrast, after the
collapse of the Soviet Union the Russian foreign policy shifted to the "near abroad" in
1993, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and the Russian future military doctrine
seems to have become more aggressive. Furthermore, Russia still claims to be a great
power in global prospectives.
The only important thing to remember always is that Russia must be
treated with respect. Our people will never accept any other language
from any state whatsoever. 25*
- Transition to Democracy - In spite of the German history and tradition of
democratic and liberal forces and parties as well as the resistance against Hitler and the
Nazi regime from inside Germany, the prerequisites for the transition toward and
consolidation of democracy in West Germany after World War II came first of all from
outside by intervention. The signature of the unconditional surrender of the German
armed forces on 7 May 1945 was — in contrast to the end of World War I -- the sign of
total defeat. Germany was occupied by the Allied armed forces which were in command
and control of every action. The Nazi party (NSDAP) was eliminated, and the old
totalitarian structures and lines of communication were destroyed. In contrast, in Russia
the transition came from inside by transformation. The old post-totalitarian and
antidemocratic forces are still alive, and old force structures and lines of communication
are still working. The Russian security and intelligence establishment underlines this
problem.
Marked continuities between the old Soviet system and the new Russian
security and intelligence establishment are to be expected. The MVD
(ministry of interior) remains in operation both formally and substantively.
Although the KGB has been formally abolished, all the KGB's subparts
have survived, some now autonomous, most ofthem merely relocated. 25
'
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- Consolidation of Democracy - The process of transition toward and
consolidation of democracy in West Germany was under control as well as protection of
the Western Allies, the United States, Great Britain, and France. All former armed forces
which had supported the Nazi regime directly or indirectly or could be a threat to the
process of democratization were eliminated — Geheime Staatspolizei (GeStaPo),
Schutzstaffel (SS) and Waffen SS as well as the Wehrmacht herself. In contrast, in Russia
are several important forces still under weapons ~ Border Troops, Internal Troops,
Russian Armed Forces (Navy, Strategic Rocket Forces, Air Defense Forces, Air Forces,
Ground Forces), Civil Defense Troops, Railroad Troops and Construction Troops,
Cossacks. The August coup in 1991 and the October Mutiny in 1993 underline the
problem of command and control in general. The problem of civil-military relations isn't
solved until today.
- Constitutional and Governmental Aspects - Beside the allied intervention the
Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1949 was also a result of democratic
traditions and lessons learned from Weimar. The state created on the basis of this Basic
Law was a state of laws with political parties, basic civil rights, the separation of powers
and representative government {Bundestag). For example, the Basic Law has no provision
for emergency decrees, and the power of the president is limited in general. In contrast,
Russia has neither a democratic tradition nor lessons learned from own history concerning
democratization.
It is frequently argued ~ Russia is a favorite example — that the absence of
democratic traditions impedes the consolidation of new democratic
institutions and, conversely, that democracy is more stable in countries ...
that have enjoyed it in the past. What this argument misses is that if a
country had a democratic regime ..., it is a veteran not only of democracy
but of the successful subversion of democracy. Political learning, in other
words, cuts both ways. Democrats may find the work of consolidation
easier when they can rely on past traditions, but antidemocratic forces also
have an experience from which they can draw lessons : people know that
overthrowing democracy is possible, and may even know how to do it. 260
1 Przeworski, Adam. Alvarez, Michael, Cheibub, Jose A. and Limongi, Fernando, "What Makes
Democracy Endure ?" Journal of Democracy , vol. 7, no. 1, January 1996, pp. 43-44.
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- Economy and Ethnic Problems - After World War II West German
reconstruction and economic growth were supported by the Marshall Plan of the United
States. Furthermore, in the process of democratization Germany was not confronted with
ethnic problems. In contrast, in Russia the solution of the economic crisis and the ethnic
problems are two main sources of conflict in the process of democratization.
- Armed Forces - The rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany was under
control of the Western Allies. The Bundeswehr came into existence one decade after the
fall of the Third Reich and six years after the foundation of the Federal Republic of
Germany. Right from the beginning in 1955 the Bundeswehr was an armed force in a
democratic state. Furthermore, right from the beginning the Bundeswehr was a conscript
armed force as well as an alliance armed force.
- Civil-Military Relations - The problem of civil-military relations was solved in
the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1950s, first of all by basic civilian control, e.g.,
basic law, institutions, a civilian as Minister ofDefense, and then ~ in addition ~ by Inner
e
Fiihrung. Innere Fiihrung is a result of the specific German history and lessons learned. In
contrast, without a consolidated democracy Russia never will be able to control its own
armed forces and to establish basic civilian control. This control will be difficult to
establish because parliamentary oversight in Russia suffers from two problems : the
Duma's historical legacy of weak constitutional authority to review and amend executive
decisions, and the ability of the executive to circumvent parliamentary funding
prerogatives. "Here, effective civilian control can come only through a fundamental review
of existing constitutional provisions." 261
(4) These differences lead to the fourth main finding of this study. Russia should
analyse Innere Fiihrung with the intention of finding some answers to her own problems
of civil-military relations. But Russia must keep in mind the historical context and the
specific circumstances ofthe German Innere Fiihrung.
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(5) The analysis of German history leads to the fifth main finding of this study.
Many conditions for the transition toward and consolidation of democracy in the Weimar
Republic are very similar to the situation in Russia today.
- Crisis of the Foreign and Security Policy - The old European balance of power
was destroyed after World War I. Germany lost power, prestige, and territory. But
Germany never quit the ambitions to be a great power. The aims of German foreign and
security policy was the revision of the Treaty of Versailles by negotiation and conciliation.
The old balance of power was also destroyed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Now
the Soviet Union / Russia lost power, prestige, and territory. And also Russia today still
claims to be a great power with aims in the foreign and security policy toward the "near
abroad."
- Constitutional Crisis - In Russia today the strong position of the President and
the Art. 87.-2. of the Russian Constitution are comparable with the position of the
President of the Weimar Republic and the famous Art. 48 of the Weimar Constitution
(emergency-decree power).
In the event of aggression against the Russian Federation or a direct threat
or aggression, the President of the Russian Federation may introduce
martial law throughout the Russian Federation or in specific localities ... . 262
These aspects may not be a problem in states were democracy is the only game in
town. In Weimar it was a central problem and opened the way to Hitler and Nazi
Germany. In Russia these aspects can also become a threat to the process of
democratization when the next President is from an extreme right or extreme left party.
- Governmental Crisis - The weakness and little willingness on the part of the
political parties to compromise led to the permanent malaise in the Weimar Reichstag as
well as in the Russian State Duma today.
262
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- Crisis of the Economy - Inflation, depression, unemployment, and influx of
foreign capital characterized the economy of the Weimar Republic as well as Russia's
economy today.
- Crisis of the Armed Forces and Civil-Military Relations - The Reichswehr had
lost the Great War and had to handle heavy budget cuts as well as armed forces
reductions. Furthermore, several paramilitary groups became a factor in the domestic
decision making process of Weimar. Also the Soviet / Russian Armed Forces have lost the
last wars — Afghanistan and the Chechen War — and have to handle heavy budget cuts
and armed forces reductions. In addition, also in Russia several armed forces play an
important domestic role, e.g., Border Troops, Interior Troops, Cossacks. In Weimar and
Russia today the problems of command and control as well as civil-military relations are
similar.
(6) The analysis of Russian history and present Russia leads to the sixth main
finding of this thesis. Will the Russian military become involved in politics and seize
political power against the process of democratization in future ? It is possible to analyse
several scenarios. However, the answers to this question still remain controvers. For
example, James H. Brusstar and Ellen Jones come to the following conclusion :
There is one scenario in which the military may be the prime architect of
political change. If there were complete political paralysis at the center, the
high command could initiate a seizure of power to restore order.
Alternately, selected regional military commanders might forge a coalition
with like-minded provincial leaders, to seize power with the goal of
restoring the centralized state. However, a military-initiated seizure of
power is likely only if there were a complete collapse of central authority
and military leaders and the officer corps became convinced that only
intervention by the Armed Forces could prevent Russia's descent into
anarchy. 263
In contrast, Mikhail Tsypkin argued in 1992 that it seems that the Russian military
will not seize power in future to restore order :
263
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The military in Russian and Soviet history never took power for itself. The
Russian/Soviet political elites, however, have generally found it impossible
to keep or achieve power without active support from the military because
of the country's lack of representative institutions, vast ethnic diversity,
and sheer size. ...
Theoretically, if political instability continues unabated, the military might
become motivated to break with the tradition and make a bid for undivided
power. In reality, however, this is not the most likely scenario because the
political process in the Russian society are directly reflected, if not
magnified, in the armed forces. Chaos in the society as a whole whould
only mean further disintegration of the military, whose factions then would
align with whatever political forces arise to fill the great vacuum. 26*
(7) Finally, this study underlines that Russia's present situation is intricate and
unstable in domestic policy as well as in foreign policy. The government seems to be
unable to solve the budget crisis, the economic crisis, ethnic problems, and problems ofthe
military. Russia really needs international support to be successful in the process of
democratization. But Russia must accept the rules of the game — peace, democracy and
human rights. A Russian foreign policy with the intention of restoring the former Soviet
Union, a more aggressive Russian military doctrine as well as a more offensive military
strategy are violations of these rules of the game.
Russia's grand strategy in future and the action and reaction of Russia's neighbors
as well as NATO and the United States depends on whether Russia will be able to
establish a viable democracy like the Federal Republic of Germany or will relapse into
authoritarianism, post-totalitarianism or even totalitarianism and a passion for empire-
building like Nazi Germany after the failure ofthe Weimar Republic.
Perhaps one day Russia might even become somehow ordinary, a country
of problems rather than catastrophes, a place that develops rather than
explodes. That would be something to see. 265
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In a world of nuclear weapons a Russian catastrophe could become very fast a
regional or even global catastrophe, and a Russian explosion could become a global
explosion — the worst case scenario is World War III. Remember, Germany was defeated
and weak after World War I, and the axis powers were satisfied. Germany became a
democracy, and there was the dream of a better and more peaceful world because of the
lessons learned from Germany and World War I. There was the League of Nations ... and
then ... Hitler ... Munich 1938 ... war ... Holocaust.
125
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